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A Consumer Oriented Approach to Regulation of




During the past several years there has been an ongoing struggle between the
utility industry, their regulatory commissions and the Cost of Living Council.
The struggle began when Congress mandated that utility prices be included in
the economic stabilization program, just as prices in the other industries were
included in the program.
2
One method after another was attempted by the federal price con-
trollers to bring utility prices under control. Phase IV of the economic
stabilization program marked the end of the struggle at least temporarily, with
the total surrender of the Cost of Living Council, when it granted an exemp-
tion to utilities from further participation in the price control program.
The Cost of Living Council was not the only loser in this struggle. Consumers,
labor and other industries also lost as they were made to bear the full rigors
of the price control program, increased by the uncontrolled utility prices.
t The author acknowledges the encouragement in preparing this article of Pro-
fessor Roy Schotland, Georgetown University Law Center, in whose administrative law
course the idea for this article was formulated.
* Assistant Professor, International School of Law, Washington, D.C., A.B., 1967,
J.D., 1973 Georgetown Law Center.
1. Articles dealing with the utility and carrier industries and the treatment which
they have received at the hands of economic stabilization programs are few. D. Toll,
Prive Commission Regulation of Public Utilities, AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION'S SEC-
TION ON PUBLIC UTILITY LAW ANNUAL PUBLICATION 5 (1972) presents a description of
Phase I and the first several months of Phase II, as it applied to the utility industry.
V. Hirschberg, Higher Utility Rates Loom as Price Panel Assigns Control Duties to
Regulatory Agencies, 4 NATIONAL JOURNAL 512-524 (1972) offers a consumer oriented
criticism of the Price Commission and its treatment of utilities. L. Jourolmon, War-
time Utility Rate Control, 17 TENN. L. REv. 915 (1943) offers a discussion of the
economic stabilization program as it related to utilities during World War II.
2. Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799.
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The following will describe the struggle that occurred, the problems which
defeated the Cost of Living Council and outline a basic program of re-
form which would permit control of utility prices, just as prices in other
industries are controlled.
The Economic Stabilization Act and the Price Commission
The Economic Stabilization Act originated in the House Committee on Bank-
ing and Currency, and was approved by Congress on August 15, 1970.3 The
Act was largely the work of Congressional Democrats concerned about the
economy and eager to influence President Nixon's economic policies. 4
Nixon opposed the Act and said that he would not exercise the authority
which it granted, as such action "simply does not fit the economic condi-
tions which exist today.", White House supporters in Congress opposed the
grant of presidential power as a political maneuver by Democrats to blame
the President with inaction if inflation continued.6
However, as a result of continuing inflation, 7 a sluggish recovery from
the 1969 recession, a worsening foreign trade balance, and a deepening
3. Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799 (Aug. 15,
1970), as amended, 84 Stat. 1468 (1970), 85 Stat. 13 (1971), 85 Stat. 38 (1971) [herein-
after cited as 1970 Act] Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No.
92-210, 85 Stat. 743 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Amendments]. The Economic
Stabilization Act of 1970 was tacked on as an amendment to the Act to Extend the
Defense Production Act of 1950 by the House Committee on Banking and Currency
after the Senate has passed the Defense Production Act extension. In signing the bill
the President stated that if it were not for the needed Defense Production Act exten-
sion, he would have vetoed it.
4. See Hearings to Extend the Defense Production Act of 1950 and The Stabiliza-
tion Act of 1970 Before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1970). Control over interest was given on other occasions. Regulatory
authority over banks' and other savings institutions' interest rates was enacted during a
period of credit restraint in 1966, 80 Stat. 823. It was designed to preserve the flow
of funds to institutions financing home-building by reducing competition for deposits.
Congress gave the President authority to direct the Federal Reserve Board to control
credit and interest rates in a bill passed in 1969, 83 Stat. 371. See 1969 Congressional
Quarterly Almanac 925. The 1971 Amendments, § 203, authorized the President to
regulate interest rates and dividends. However, Exec. Order No. 11,627, 3 C.F.R. 223
(1971), CCH, Economic Controls # 8010 subjected them only to voluntary restraints.
5. 6 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1078 (1970).
6. 1970 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 430, 903.
7. Inflationary processes may arise under a great many very different circum-
stances. Total war is always accompanied by inflation. Large-scale mobilization pro-
grams likewise give rise to inflationary processes unless adequate anti-inflationary
measures are taken. The added soldiers, sailors and munitions workers earn dollars
that are just as good in the stores as anybody else's. But their out put does not flow
into the stores. See The Twentieth Century Fund, DEFENSE WITHOUT INFLATION
59-96 (1951). It is also argued that at least mild inflation must be expected if near
full employment levels are to be maintained in an economy like the United States.
Others suggest, further, that inflation is a necessary condition or by-product of rapid
economic growth. See R. NURSKE, PROBLEMS OF CAPITAL FORMATION IN UNDER-
[Vol. 23:61
Regulation of Utility Prices
deficit in the nation's balance of international payments, as well as a grow-
ing lack of public confidence in his ability to manage the economy,8 the
President changed his mind in mid-1971. 9 On August 15, 1971 the Presi-
dent issued Executive Order No. 11615 which set in motion Phase I of the
stabilization program. 10 Its purpose was to freeze the economy, or at least
chill it, for ninety days. The Order covered "prices, rents, wages and sala-
ries" and prohibited increases in those categories beyond the levels reached
in the thirty-day period preceding the date of the Order. It excluded raw ag-
ricultural products from regulation.
The Order created the Cost of Living Council and delegated to it all the
powers which the Act had given to the President." The Order also provided
that anyone who willfully violated it or any of the regulations issued under its
authority, would be fined up to $5,000 for each violation, 1 2 and would be
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 112-117 (1953). For a more complete discussion of the situa-
tions under which inflation may arise, see AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR
PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, INFLATION: ITS CAUSES AND CURES (1966); A. OKUN, IN-
FLATION: THE PROBLEMS IT CREATES AND THE POLICIES IT REQUIRES 3 (1970).
8. For a history of the development of fiscal and monetary controls in the United
States, see S. HARRIS, AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 95-240 (1961); E. GOLDENWEISER,
AMERICAN MONETARY POLICY (1951); L. KIMMEL, FEDERAL BUDGET AND FISCAL
POLICY: 1788-1958 (1959). For more on the general area of price controls, see
J. Galbraith, Market Structure and Stabilization Policy, 49 REV. ECON. S. STAT. 124
(1957); D. Humphrey, The Effectiveness of Price Control, A MANUAL OF PRICE
CONTROL 306 (1943).
9. See ECONOMIC REPORT OFTHE PRESIDENTS 1972 3-7, 56-116 for President
Nixon's explanation of his resort to price controls. The President states:
In the Summer of 1971 the American economy was beset by a conflict among
four objectives: faster growth, higher employment, greater price stability,
and a more balanced external position. The danger was that steps to speed
up growth and boost employment by expanding demand would worsen both
the inflation and the balance-of-payments deficit. The steps initiated on Au-
gust 15 greatly increased the possibility of simultaneous progress on all four
fronts. The price and wage control system has provided more room for ex-
panding growth and employment even while inflation and inflationary expec-
tations are being reduced.
Id. at 101.
10. Exec. Order No. 11,615, 3 C.F.R. 199 (1971).
11. Id. The Cost of Living Council delegated administrative authority to the
Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP). CLC Order No. 1, 36
Fed. Reg. 16215 (1971). Further, the CLC delegated certain administrative functions
to the Secretary of the Treasury. CLS Order No. 5, 36 Fed. Reg. 21798 (1971). The
Treasury Department then redelegated this authority to the Internal Revenue Service.
Treasury Department Order No. 150-76, 36 Fed. Reg. 22188 (1971). The CLC, while
preserving its overall authority, assigned wage responsibility to the Pay Board and
price responsibility to the Price Commission, CLC Order No. 3, 36 Fed. Reg. 20202
(1971); CLC Order No. 4, 36 Fed. Reg. 20202 (1971).
12. Section 204 of the 1970 Act provided that "[Wihoever willfully violates any order
or regulation under this title shall be fined not more than $5,000." The words "for
each violation" made their first appearance in Exec. Order No. 11,615, apparently
without any statutory authority. 3 C.F.R. 201 (1971). The issue has been mooted by
§ 208 of the 1971 Amendments which provides for civil penalties ($2,500) and crimi-
nal penalties ($5,000) "for each violation."
1973]
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subject to appropriate injunctive relief.' 3
Phase II was born on November 14, 197 1.14 It was conceived by Execu-
tive Order No. 11627.18 This Order created a Pay Board made up of fifteen
members, five each from the general public, business, and organized,
labor, and a Price Commission composed of seven public members.' 6 The
Order was subsequently confirmed and refined by Executive Order No.
11640,17 which was issued on December 22, 1971, concurrently with the
President's signing of the 1971 amendments to the original Act. The 1971
amendments evidenced congressional attempts to furnish standards to guide
the President in the exercise of his authority to stabilize the economy. The
original Act had failed to establish such standards. However, the amended
Act set forth standards that were so vague as to add little that the due
process clause had not already impliedly furnished. Thus, among other
things, the President was directed to be "fair and equitable," and to pre-
vent "gross inequities." The standards called "for generally comparable
sacrifices by business and labor as well as other segments of the economy."' 8
The federal district courts were given exclusive jurisdiction of cases aris-
ing under the Act. 19 Appeals from district court decisions were handled ex-
13. 1971 Amendments § 209.
14. See n.9 infra.
15. Exec. Order No. 11,627, 3 C.F.R. 222 (1971).
16. Exec. Order No. 11,627, § 8(a), 3 C.F.R. 222 (1971).
17. Exec. Order No. 11,640, 37 Fed. Reg. 1213 (1972).
18. 1971 Amendments § 203(b)(5). The constitutionality of the 1970 Act was
upheld in Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971).
Judge Leventhal, writing for a three-judge court, upheld the validity of the original
Stabilization Act and the Phase I regulatory action thereunder. The court, noted that
the delegation of congressional power was within permissible constitutional limits and
that the legislative standards were sufficient to enable a court to determine whether
the Presidential action was consistent with the legislative will. Id. at 755. The court
looked to the legislative history of the 1970 Act to discern the underlying congres-
sional purpose which, had the Act contained clear and explicit standards, would have
been unnecessary. It would not be useful to analyze the Meat Cutters opinion be-
cause the amendments to the Act have mooted the arguments about inadequate stand-
ards, even though as a practical matter, as stated in E. Lev, Economic Control Regu-
lations: A Descriptive Commentary, 13 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 1277, 1300-01 (1972):
... the amendments furnish no more meaningful standards that did the
original Act, which provided virtually none at all .... It seems apparent
from these cases (several others were discussed) that a general challenge to
the economic legislation on constitutional grounds is doomed to failure.
Wage and price stabilization is not novel. It is not a startling departure
from economic custom. The concept of a federal government with limited
powers has just about vanished. The political power unit is the nation. If
inflation is a national problem, it must be solved by the national legislature.
The courts are simply not prepared to intervene.
19. 1971 Amendments, § 211. In connection with the initiation of Phase II of the
Nixon Administration's wage and price control program, the President proposed to
Congress in October, 1971, that it extend and amend the statutory authority for the
controls of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970. The amendments of the Act,
[Vol. 23:61
19731 Regulation of Utility Prices
clusively in a newly created Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, which
with one important qualification was granted the powers of a Circuit Court
of Appeals.
20
approved by Congress and signed by the President on December 22, 1971, elaborated
the standards to which the Price Commission actions and decisions had to conform
and created a specialized system for judicial review of stabilization measures. The
amendments were intended to achieve three primary ends: (1) speed and consistency
of decisions in cases arising under the Act, (2) avoidance of any breaks or stays in
the operation of the Stabilization Program, and (3) relief for particular persons ag-
grieved by the operation of the program. See S. Rep. No. 92-507, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 10
(1971). State courts were permitted to consider a defense based on the Act or the
regulations, unless the defense questioned the constitutionality of the Act or the
validity of the regulations, in which event removal by either party to a federal court
was permitted.
In addition, the amendments directed the Price Commission to establish by regula-
tion appropriate procedures, including agency review, "available to any person for the
purpose of seeking an interpretation, modification or recission of, or seeking an excep-
tion or exemption from . . . rules, regulations, and orders." Congress exempted the
Price Commission from most of the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.
1971 Amendments § 207(a). It was felt that these requirements would result in
"too cumbersome and dilatory a procedure." See S. Rep. No. 92-507, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 8 (1971). Congress rejected, however, the Administration's proposal, S. 2712,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 207 (1971), that the Price Commission, like that of the
Korean period, Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2159 (1951), be
exempted from all of the Act's requirements. The 1971 Amendments did subject
the Price Commission to the section of the APA that governs the rule-making process,
the procedures by which generally applicable regulations are formulated. 5 U.S.C.
§ 553 (1970). The section, when it applied, required that notice of proposed rule-
making be published in the Federal Register; interested parties were then given "an
opportunity to participate in the rule-making through submission of written data,
views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation." In most cases,
substantive rules must be published at least thirty days before they are to take effect.
5 U.S.C. § 553(d). The Price Commission at first took much advantage of § 553(b)B
of the APA, which allows agencies to disregard the prescribed rule-making procedure,
"when the agency for good cause finds . . . that notice and public procedure thereon
are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." The general regula-
tions promulgated at the outset of the Phase II controls were designed to govern nearly
all sectors of the economy. Because of the extremely broad scope of these initial
regulations and the time pressures under which they were formulated, the APA's rule-
making procedures would have been of little utility. The Price Commission also re-
mained subject to § 555, and 706 of the APA.
20. 1971 Amendments, 88 211(b)(1), (2). The Act provided that the Emergency
Court was deprived of power to issue interlocutory decrees "staying or restraining in
whole or in part any provision of this title, or the effectiveness of any regulation or
order issued thereunder." 1971 Amendments, § 211(b)(1). Similarly, the district
court was deprived of its customary power to grant interlocutory relief to stay en-
forcement of a regulation it considered unlawful, except with regard to a party before
it, 1971 Amendments, § 211(d)(1), and then only for the same reasons which au-
thorize the Emergency Court to invalidate the regulations and orders. If a district
court concluded that a substantial constitutional question existed, the question had to
be certified to the Emergency Court. A regulation was permitted to be set aside by
the Emergency Court only after judgement, and then only if the regulation was in
excess of the agency's authority, arbitrary or capricious, or otherwise unlawful under
5 U.S.C. § 706(2). Appeals from interlocutory decisions of district courts were per-
mitted to be taken under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to the Emergency Court. 1971 Amend-
ments § 211(d)(2). Further appeal rested on the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. 1971 Amendments § 211(g).
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The administration of the wage program was simple compared to the fix-
ing of price levels. The truth of this is exhibited by a comparison of the
regulations. Whereas wage increases were to be calculated according to a
5.5 percent limit, prices were to be controlled by a formula whose compo-
nents included allowable costs, productivity gains and profit margins, all of
which escaped mathematical precision. 21 There were three broad groups to
which price regulations applied: manufacturers, retailers and wholesalers,
and service and professional organizations. 22  Each group was treated dif-
ferently but all were subject to the general rule that prices could not be in-
creased over the base price except when justified by allowable cost in-
creases and not even then if the effect of the price boost was to raise the
company's profit margins. The regulation read:
A manufacturer may charge a price in excess of the base price only
to reflect increases in allowable costs that it incurred since the last
price increase in the item concerned, or that it incurred after
January 1, 1971, whichever was later, and that it is continuing to
incur, reduced to reflect productivity gains, and only to the ex-
tent that the increased price does not result in an increase in its
profit margin over that which prevailed during the base period.
23
As can be seen, Congress gave the regulatory agencies in this area practi-
cally unlimited discretion. The vagueness of the standards furnished, cou-
pled with the prohibition against temporary restraints by the district courts,
constituted a grant of immense power to the new agencies. During the 16
months of Phase I and Phase II the rate of inflation decreased, total em-
ployment rose, the rate of unemployment dropped, and real spendable earn-
ings rose. In general, the program received wide public acceptance and vol-
untary cooperation. 24
The Price Commission and the Public Utilities
During the price control programs of World War II and the Korean War,
21. The publicized two and one-half percent limit on prices had no application to
an individual enterprise. It was a broad governmental objective to limit the nationwide
average price increases to that figure. No enterprise could be compelled to reduce its
prices below those prevailing on May 25, 1970. 1971 Amendments, § 203(a)(1).
22. 6 C.F.R. § 300.12, .13, .14 (1972).
23. 6 C.F.R. § 300.12 (1972). For a complete description of the administration
of the Price Control program see E. Lev, Economic Control Regulations: A Descrip-
tive Commentary, 13 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 1277, 1290, -1297 (1972).
24. See R. Jordon, Wage-Price Controls and the Shifting Phillips Curve, BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECONOMIC AcTivrry 385-421 (1972) which offers econometric evidence
that controls had an effect. Wages and prices apparently rose less rapidly during the
controls period than would have been predicted from equations estimated on precontrols
data. See also COST OF LIVING COUNCIL, PHASE III: ECONOMIC STABILIZATION PRO-
PROGRAM 24 (1973).
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utilities were exempt from federal price control programs. 25 Leon Hender-
son, one of the authors of the World War II price control program and the
first Price Administrator of that program, gave as reasons for exempting
utlities that: they seemed to be under an adequate system of state regula-
tion;26 this was an area not likely to give difficulty or to cause, so far as then
could be seen, any inflationary trend; they had problems peculiar to them-
selves and no further regulation seemed necessary; 2 7 and the agencies in
control of their rates were found to be just as earnest as the Price Adminis-
trator about keeping their costs down.
28
Henderson's reasoning is generally supported by the Consumer and Re-
tail Price Indexes. These indexes reflect the fact that utility prices were on
a decline from before World War I until well into the 1960's. The utility
indexes continued to show that utility prices were declining during World
War I, World War II, and the Korean War, despite the sharp growth of the
25. In the price control program of World War II, Section 3022(c) of the Emer-
gency Price Control Act of 1942 specifically exempted "regulation of ... rates
charged by any common carrier or other public utility." Emergency Price Control
Act of 1942, ch. 26, § 302, 56 Stat. 23, 36. This total exemption was later curtailed by
an amendment to that statute, which prescribed that no public utility or carrier could
increase its rates "unless it first gives thirty days notice to the President, or such
agency as he may designate, and consents to the timely intervention by such agency
before the federal, state or municipal authority having jurisdiction to consider such
increase." Act of October 2, 1942, ch. 578, § 1, 56 Stat. 765. The United States
Supreme Court found the Act constitutional and acknowledged that Congress intended
that final ratemaking authority should be retained by the various regulatory commis-
sions. Vinson v. Washington Gas Light Co., 321 U.S. 489 (1944). The Court stated
that Congress "limited the right of the Executive to notice by the utility and the util-
ity's consent that the Executive might be heard by the regulatory body having final
authority in the premises." Id. at 498. During the Korean War Congress again
exempted utilities and carriers from the price controls. The authority conferred by
the Defense Production Act of 1950 was not to be exercised with respect to "rates
charged by any common carrier or other public utility." Defense Production Act of
1950, ch. 932 § 402(e)(v), 64 Stat. 798, 806. However, utilities had to again give
thirty days notice of any increase and the Executive was allowed timely intervention.
26. Hearings on H.R. 5479 Before the House Committee on Banking and Currency,
77th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 444 (1941) where it was said that ". . . public utilities
were under what for the time being at least seemed to be an adequate system of state
regulation, and therefore did not need to be brought into review."
27. Id. at 54-55.
Now, as to the utilities, there is as the members are aware, an adequate set
of regulations as to the charges which utilities can make. These, again, are
based upon a long series of judicial determinations, of state regulations and
state laws. It seemed to those drafting the bill that this was an area which
was not likely to give difficulty or to cause, so far as they could see at that
time, any inflationary trend. The bill is designed to control an emergency
inflationary situation and has left them out, just as it has transportation rates.
There are questions peculiar to utilities and none of them, so far as I see at
the present time, would make necessary further regulation by means of a
price-control bill.
28. Id. at 445.
I have found that every one of the agencies charged with these particular
items of cost are just as earnest as we are about keeping those costs down.
1973]
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indexes for other items. The reason for the decline was the ever improving
technology and efficiency of the utilities, the cost savings of which were passed
through to consumers.
INDEXES FOR SELECTED UTILITY AND CARRIER PRICES DURING
WORLD WAR I, WORLD WAR II AND THE KOREAN WAR
World War I World War II Korean War
Year 1915 1920 1940 1945 1949 1952
All Items, CP129 43.4 85.7 59.9 76.9 101.8 113.5
CPI for Gas
and Electricity. 29  NA NA 103.9 100.7 102.5 104.5
RPI for Elect.100 k.w. hrs.30  NA NA 105.1 102.4 99.4 100.3
Average Price in Cents/
100 k.w. hrs.3 1 8.6 6.9 3.88 3.76 3.68 3.63
RPI for Natural Gas/
10 Therms8 0  59.7 77.2 117.2 107.1 96.2 99.5
Telephone toll rates between
N.Y. C. and Denver 3 2  11.25 10.40 3.25 2.35 2.20 2.20
S.F. 20.70 16.50 4.00 2.50 2.50 2.50
CPI for Public
Transportation 2 9  NA NA 81.3 82.3 111.2 141.5
NA (Not Available)
1947-1949=100
There were those, however, who advocated that federal price controls
should be applied to utilities. For example, Leon Jourolmon, a commis-
sioner of the Tennessee Railroad and Public Utility Commission, pub-
lished an article in 1942 citing numerous abuses, inconsistencies, and
unjustified price increases in the utility and carrier industry during World
War I and World War H.33 He suggested that utilities should have the
same obligation to assume an equitable share of the burdens of war as
other citizens, that is, be subject to federal price controls.
34
It was not until the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, however, that utili-
ties were included in federal price controls. A number of factors led to the
inclusion of utilities in these controls. First, during the 1960's the utility prices
ended their long-term decline and started to inflate. This was due in large
measure to the rapid increase in interest rates, and the increase in construc-
tion and labor costs, which were suddenly outpacing the cost savings from
29. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1957 125, Series E 113-139 (1960).
30. Id. at 129, Series E 177-185.
31. Id. at 510, Series 570-80.
32. Id. at 481, Series R 10-13.
33. L. Jourolmon, Wartime Utility Rate Control, 17 TENN. L. REV. 915 (1943).
34. Id. at 924.
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developments in technology. Utility prices became a victim of demand pull
inflation, a plague experienced by almost every industry in the 1960's.3 5
PERCENT INCREASE OR DECREASE IN THE CODNSUMER PRICE INDEX
FOR SELECTED UTILITIES AND CARRIERS IN 1968, 1969, and 1970
1968 1969 1970
All Items CPI 4.736 6.138 5.541
Utilities and Public Transportation CPI 2.93
7  3.838 8.041
Local Transportation Fares CPI NA 4.339 20.040
Railroad Fares CPI NA 8.139 12.242
Airplane Fares CPI NA 13.639 4.742
Bus Fares CPI NA 8.639 11.542
Electric CPI 1.236 3.240 5.543
Gas CPI 1.236 3.640 5.843
Telephone CPI NA .940 2.543
Water CPI NA 4.240 12.943
NA (Not Available)
With utility prices in many cases outstripping other consumer items a
majority of Henderson's reasons for exempting utilities were no longer valid.
A second factor which made utility prices ripe for non-exemption was
the advance in economic theory in this area since the Korean price con-
trols. 44 For example, Briefs and Means developed a theory to justify
35. For more on cost push analysis see W. Morton, Trade Unionism, Full Employ-
ment and Inflation, 40 AMER. ECON. REV. 13 (1950); L. Gallaway, The Wage-Push
Inflation Thesis, 1950-1957, 48 AMER. EcON. REV. 967 (1958); W. BOWEN, THE
WAGE-PRICE ISSUE: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS (1960); R. Turvey, Some Aspects of the
Theory of Inflation in a Closed Economy, 61 ECON. J. 531 (1951). See also A. Boyd,
Inflation and Public Utility Regulation ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION SECTION ON PUBLIC UTILITY LAW 1 (1959).
36. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX FOR DECEMBER,
1968 4, Table I (1969).
37. Id. at 17, Table 8.
38. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX FOR DECEMBER,
1969 6, Table 1 (1969).
39. ld. at 21, Table 8.
40. Id. at 19, Table 8.
41. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX FOR DECEMBER,
1970 8, Table I (1971).
42. Id. at 23, Table 8.
43. Id. at 21, Table 8.
44. In the World War II Korean War period, economic thought was not far re-
moved from the theory of inflation, rooted in the quantity theory of money, that an
increase in the quantity of the circulating medium was the common cause and char-
acteristic of inflation. Since governments were responsible for the increase in the
quantity of the circulating medium, it was governments that caused inflation. Utility
rates according to this theory had no relation to the quantity of the circulating medium,
and so could not be the cause of inflation. As a result price controls in this area would
be inappropriate. For more on the quantity theory see M. Friedman, The Quantity
Theory of Money, in STUDIES IN THE QUANTITY OF MONEY (M. Friedman ed. 1956);
A. Lerner, The Inflationary Process: Some Theoretical Aspects, 31 REV. ECON. & STAT.
1943 (1949).
Keynesian theory, which won popularity during World War II, put the emphasis on
the supply and demand for goods and services. It found inflation was related to ex-
70 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 23:61
cess demand, the condition which prevailed when the quantity demanded was greater
than the quantity which could be supplied at current prices. Demand pull resulted
from the existence of an excess demand over supply at current prices. Cost push re-
sulted from the increase in costs in market situations in which producers were able to
pass cost increases on to the purchasers in the form of higher prices.
Keynesian theory is more readily applicable to carrier prices than to utility prices.
Carriers, like most private firms, consider market (demand) factors as well as cost
(supply) factors in determining their rate structures. Rate structures are often a
mixture of cost of service and value of service considerations. Where competition is
strong, rates tend toward the cost of service; where competition is weak, toward the
value of service. C. PHILLIPS in THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION THEORY AND PRACTICE
IN THE TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC INDUSTRIES (1969) at 313 mentions railroad
prices as an example of the importance of demand considerations. He writes:
As a result of (a) the difficulty of finding the cost of carrying a specific
commodity and (b) the favorable results obtainable through discrimination,
there is little attempt to set specific railroad rates on the basis of cost, if
cost is used in the sense of including both fixed and variable costs. Railroad
rate differentiation is largely based upon demand characteristics or how
much the potential buyer of the service values it.
See also Interstate Commerce Commission, Bureau of Transport Economics and
Statistics, Value of Service in Rate Making, Statement No. 5912 (1959); C. WILCOX,
PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD BUSINESS 334-340 (1966); E. TROXEL, ECONOMICS OF
TRANSPORTATION 169-193 (1955) (discusses demands for movements of goods); H.
NORTON, MODERN TRANSPORTATION ECONOMICS 122-148 (1963) (discusses demand for
and pricing of transportation services); K. SAMPSON ET AL, PRACTICE, THEORY AND
POLICY 97-149 (1966) (discusses demand and supply in transportation).
The application of Keynesian theory to utilities requires some modifications as far
as demand pull is concerned. Demand pull assumes a free enterprise situation, a
system in which individuals are substantially free to sell the product of their labor
to the highest bidder and to spend their incomes thus obtained by buying from the
cheapest source of supply the goods and services that yield the greatest satisfaction.
But demand and supply, it might be argued, are not factors which are considered
in the utility rate making situation. Or to say it another way, it is not the market place
and free enterprise which determines utility rates, but regulatory commissions.
Further, consumers have little choice in buying or not buying utility services. Such
services are necessities, and are supplied by monopolies.
A study by F. FISHER, A STUDY IN ECONOMETRICS: THE DEMAND FOR ELECTRICITY
IN THE UNITED STATES (1962) supports this line of reasoning. Fisher found that the
price of electricity has no effect on demand. Id. at 5. If such is the case, then follow-
ing Keynesian analysis, utilities could well argue that they do not cause demand pull
inflation. Even if there were an excess of demand over supply, utility and carrier
prices would not be driven up, because prices are not related to demand. In A. Boyd,
Inflation and Public Utility Regulation, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION'S SECTION ON PUBLIC UTILITY LAW, 1 (1959) the vagueness can be seen
that one finds in discussions of demand pull and public utility prices:
Inflation, or a rise in price levels, is considered to be caused by one of two
reasons. The first is that any increase in demand in excess of capacity
(to meet the demand) will tend to produce price increases. This is the 'de-
mand pull" theory of inflation. The other, known as the 'cost push' theory
of inflation, is that trade union pressure can cause prices to rise in circum-
stances in which the 'demand pull' theory tells us that they ought not to rise.
Because of the high demand for new utility plants and the fact that all utility
industries are almost completely organized (by unions), it is apparent that
whatever theory of inflation you choose to follow the regulated utilities are
caught in the web.
Id. at 2.
While demand pull analysis of utility prices has its difficulties, there is no problem
with cost push analysis of utility prices. Cost push. is always the reason given for
rate increase requests. See, e.g., the statements of T. Brophy, President of General
Regulation of Utility Prices
President Kennedy's wage-price guidelines in the early 1960's. 45  This theory
held that no longer is it competition which determines prices and wages in
most industries, but discretionary decisions of companies and unions. It is
discretionary decisions which cause inflation. This better explains how
inflation on the one hand and stable demand, relatively substantial unemploy-
ment and unused industrial capacity on the other, once thought incompatible,
have managed to co-exist.
A third and perhaps the most significant factor which accounted for
utilities non-exemption from the 1970 Stabilization Act was the surprise
element. The price controls caught the utilities, their lobby groups, and the
Congress by surprise. There were several aspects to the surprise:
First, the Act was opposed by the President, who had stated during the
Congressional consideration of the Act that he would not use its authority
if it were enacted.46 Apparently taking the President at his word, no spokes-
man for the public utilities industry appeared at the hearings which were
held on the Act, nor was any mention of the possible exemption or problems
which would be involved in non-exemption ever brought up, either in hearings
or floor debate on the Act.
47
Telephone and Electronics, before the Price Commission, PRICE COMMISSION HEAR-
INGs 435-488 (February 24, 1972). R. Fitzgerald, Senior Vice President for Finance,
New England Power Service Company, Id. at 405. For more on Keynes and Keynesian
type analysis of inflation, see J. KEYNES, How TO PAY FOR THE WAR (1940); J. HICKS,
VALUE AND CAPITAL 63 (1939); M. FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY: A PROVISIONAL TEXT
3-10 (1966); A. LEVENSON, ESSENTIAL PRICE THEORY (1971); POST-KEYNESIAN
ECONOMICS (K. Kwuhara ed. 1954), especially F. Modigliani's chapter Utility Analysis
and the Consumption Function: An Interpretation of Cross-Section Data; J. PITCH-
FORD, A STUDY OF COST AND DEMAND INFLATION (1963); W. Bowen, Cost Inflation
Versus Demand Inflation: A Useful Distinction? 26 SOUTHERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL 199
(1960); A. Hart, Defense Without Inflation 59-73 (1951); F. Holzman, Inflation Cost-
Push and Demand-Pull, 50 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW (1960); F. Machlup, Another
View of Cost-Push and Demand-Pull Inflation, 42 REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATIS-
TICS 125 (1960).
45. See H. BRIEFS, PRICING POWER AND 'ADMINISTRATIVE' INFLATION (1962); G.
MEANS, PRICING POWER AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1962); see also Comment, Wage-
Price Guidelines: Informal Government Regulation of Labor and Industry, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 623 (1967); 0. Eckstein and G. Fromm, Steel and the Postwar Inflation:
Joint Economic Committee Study Paper No. 2 (1959); Bliss, Flaw in the Wage-Price
Guideposts, HARV. Bus. REV. 66 (May-June 1966); Friedman, What Price Guideposts?
GUIDELINES, INFORMAL CONTROLS AND THE MARKET PLACE 17 (G. Shultz and R. Ali-
ber, eds. 1966); C. Auerbach, Presidential Administration of Prices and Wages, 35
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 191-252 (1966); A. Thompson, The Attempt to Establish a Na-
tional Wage-Price Policy, 18 LAB. L.J. 208 (1967).
46. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
47. See Hearings to Extend the Defense Production Act of 1950 and the Stabiliza-
tion Act of 1970 Before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1970); HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY COMM., H.R. REP. No.
91-1330, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); 116 CONG. REC. 25866 (1970).
The fact that utilities, as well as their regulatory commissions were caught by
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Second, soon after it became clear in Phase II that the Price Commission
was giving up in its attempt to stop inflation in the public utility industry,
the Congress was specifically offered an amendment to an act extending
the Emergency Stabilization Act which would have forced the President to
subject the public utilities to price controls, and this amendment was re-
jected.
48
surprise is pointed up by the fact that the history of the utilities, carriers and their
regulators for the last 70 years has been one of constant battle against the fed-
eral government's ever expanding power over them. At the mere sign that the fed-
eral government, in the form of the Federal Power Commission, the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, the Securities Exchange Commission, or the Department of the
Interior is considering some action which touches on their rights, there is set in motion
a flood of lobbying and literature in opposition. There was not a word from the in-
dustry about the Economic Stabilization Act, which had the potential of putting the
entire industry under federal control for the first time in history. It was not until the
President implemented the price freeze that the industry started to react.
See: A. Priest, How Socialism Creeps-The Electric Utility Industry as an Exam-
ple, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S SECTION OF PUBLIC
UTILITY LAW 14 (1965); S. Ball, Federal Inroads on Free Competition, Id. at 22:
W. Mitchell, Federal Inroads into State Regulation, Id. at 35; T. Debevoise, Legal
Aspects of the National Power Survey, Id. at 41; E. McKeage, Federal Usurpation in
the Regulatory Field, Id. at 71 (1962); H. YOUNG, FORTY YEARS OF PUBLIC UTILITY
FINANCE 118 (1965) (discusses the industry's losing fight against the Tennessee Val-
ley Authority); E. Smykoy, The National Association of Railroad and Utility Commis-
sioners as the Originators and Promoters of Public Policy for Public Utilities (Uni-
versity of Wisconsin, Ph.D. Dissertation (1955)) (analyses-the fight between the
NARUC and ICC); J. BONBRIGHT, PUBLIC UTILITIES AND THE NATIONAL POWER
POLICIES (1940); S. SZTO, FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATION OF MOTOR CARRIER RATES
AND SERVICES (1934); FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, THE 1970 NATIONAL POWER
SURVEY 1 (1971) (the federal government owns 11.5 percent of generating capacity
in the United States).
For an example of how the industry came to the defense once the Economic Stabili-
zation Act was implemented, see H. Cohn, The Regulated Electric Utilities and Price
Controls, 89 PUB. UTIL. FORT. (April 13, 1972).
48. 117 CONG. REC. 19181 (1971). Senator Metcalf offered the amendment, stating
his purpose as being
to make clear as a matter of law that all rates and charges of major public
utilities shall remain frozen during the stabilization period. . . . The objec-
tives are, first, rate hikes for public utilities and services not only impose a
multi-billion-dollar inflationary burden on the Nation, but they hit the con-
sumer especially hard because he has virtually no way to avoid these
charges. . . . Second, the many regulatory agencies have neither the resources,
the staffing, nor the inclination to generate an aggressive testing of the evi-
dence produced by the utility companies. In addition, they tend to be biased
in favor of the businesses they regulate. Third, any rate increases approved
by the President or his delegate, should be in accord with the standards set
forth under the legislation, but in addition, and most importantly, be not in
excess of the price increase levels permitted for other industries and busi-
nesses. Utilities should be held at least to the general line with other in-
dustries. . . . The Price Commission should establish guidelines for Public
Utilities that will hold those companies to a definitive anti-inflationary
norm. . . . Thus, what we have here is really a very simple charge to the
executive branch. Because of the special impact of regulated public utilities
on our economy, and because of the inability of Federal and state regulatory
agencies to coordinate a national anti-inflationary policy, we say put the re-
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Third, when the Economic Stabilization Act was originally passed, the Con-
gress was told, and many legislators probably believed, that the Act contained
the same provisions as did the price control acts of the Second World War and
the Korean War. 49  And finally, even if the President had wanted to con-
trol inflation in the public utilities industry, no funds were provided and the
authorization period for his authority was only six months. Under these
conditions it would be physically impossible to stop inflation in the public
utilities industry.50
Regulation of the Utility Industry by Direct Controls
The success of the Price Commission in the first effort at federal control of
utility prices once the Economic Stabilization Act was implemented on
August 15, 1971 was checkered. During the periods of August 15-
November 15, 1971 and February 10-March 25, 1972 when the Price
Commission imposed a total freeze on utility prices, the Utility and Public
Transportation Consumer Price Index reflected a near zero gain. 5' There
sponsibility for permitting utility rate increases where it can best be admin-
istered, at the Presidential level.
The amendment was defeated 70 to 18.
49. Congressman Reuss stated:: "The language is identical with that used in leg-
islation in both World War II and the Korean conflict in order to enable the President
to deal with inflation." 116 CONG. REC. 26830 (1970). It is thought however, that
Congress was very aware of what it was doing. Far from acting in the dark and
merely to harass the President, the initiators of the price control program had a
rather sophisticated grasp of the inflation situation and tailored their legislation to
fit it. R. Carr, Administration and Judicial Review of Economic Controls, 39 U.
Cm. L. REv. 566, 569 (1972).
Carr's analysis of the recent price controls makes sense, but it is probably more an
after-the-fact rationalization of what did happen than what was planned by either the
Congress or the Executive. No such sophisticated analysis of the inflationary economy
and the type of price controls needed to heal it was presented at Congressional hear-
ings. The only explanation which the administration gave for the form in which
the price controls were implemented involved the desire not to have as large a bureau-
cracy as was required in earlier programs. Price Commission Chairman C. Jackson
Grayson, Jr., made the following statement to the Consumer Federation of America:
"Item-by-item controls were rejected by the Price Commission because of the large
bureaucracy required to administer such a program and the resulting dislocations to
the economy." Price Commission News Release No. 50, at 4 (January 28, 1972).
In World War II over 250,000 people were involved in the price control program.
In the Korean War the number was 17,000 and a budget of $137,000,000. In the re-
cent program less than 500 people were involved. See W. Widnall, Defense Produc-
tion Act and Economic Stabilization Act, H.R. Doc. No. 91-1330, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. (July 27, 1970).
50. For a fuller development of this point, see Congressman Blackburn's state-
ment, 116 CONG. Rnc. 26830 (1970).
51. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX FOR SEPTEMBER
1971, Table I (1971); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX FOR
OCTOBER 1971, Table I (1971). The effect of the price freeze during the periods
August 15-August 30, and November 1-November 15, 1971, so far as the Consumer
Price Index is concerned, cannot be determined. This is because the Consumer Price
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was little inflation and a near total success of the price controls during
these periods. But during all other periods, the Utility and Public Transpor-
tation Consumer Price Index increased faster, sometimes three and four
times faster than the 2.5 point rate set by the President. During the calendar
year 1972, a period when the Price Commission had complete authority to
control utility prices, the Utility and Public Transportation Consumer
Price Index inflated at a rate of 4.8 points. The rest of the economy
increased at a rate of 4.2.52 The problem was that, unlike in other in-
dustries, the Price Commission could not arrive at an effective system of price
controls short of a total freeze.
Following the total freeze on prices during Phase I, August 15-November
15, 1971, the Price Commission tried to control utility prices like the prices
in other industry. This commenced on November 17, 1971 when the
Index of August and November, 1971, reflects the entire month, not just the period
during which the price freeze was in effect. During September and October, 1971,
the Consumer Price Index for all items increased .1 and .2 points respectively each
month. During the second price freeze, February 10-March 25, 1972, which was ap-
plied only to utility prices, the Consumer Price Index for Utilities and Public
Transportation recorded a -.1 loss in March 1972, despite the fact that the freeze
was taken off on March 25, 1972. The Consumer Price Index for Utilities and
Public Transportation in February, 1972 recorded a .6 point gain. The reason
for the gain is attributable to the price increases allowed in the first ten days of
February, 1972, before the freeze was imposed. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CON-
SUMER PRICE INDEX FOR URBAN WAGE EARNERS AND CLERICAL WORKERS, UNITED STATES
CITY AVERAGE (New Series 1967 = 100) for February, 1972 Table I (1972); Id. for
March 1972.
52. During December, 1971, the Consumer Price Index for Utilities and Public
Transportation rose 1.1 points and during January, 1972, 1.5 points while the Consumer
Price Index for all items was .5 points and .1 points respectively. See BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, THE CONSUMER PICE INDEX FOR DECEMBER 1971, Table 1 (1972); Id. for
January 1972. The following table compares monthly point increases in the Consumer
Price Index for all items with the Consumer Price Index for Utilities and Public
Transportation and the Consumer Price Index for Gas and Electricity during the first
23 months of the economic stabilization program. THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX: Table 1 (1971-1973).
1971 1972
CPI Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July
All Items .4 .1 .2 .2 .5 .1 .6 .2 .3 .4 .3 .5
Utility and Public
Transportation .5 0 0 .4 1.1 1.5 .6 -. 1 .4 .2 .2 .2
Gas and Electricity .9 0 0 .6 2.0 1.2 .3 .3 .5 .4 -.2 0
1973
CPI Aug Sept Oct Nov Dee Jan Feb Mar Apr May June
All Items .2 .5 .4 .3 .4 .4 .9 1.2 .9 .8 .9
Utility and Public
Transportation .1 .3 .3 .8 .3 .6 .3 .4 .2 .2 .1
Gas and Electricity .2 .2 .2 1.3 .3 1.6 .4 .5 .5 .2 -. 3
For more charts and data on utility and carrier prices see: V. Hihschberg, Higher
Utility Rates Loom as Price Panel Assigns Control Duties to Regulatory Agencies, 4
NATIONAL JOURNAL 512-518 (1972).
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Price Commission issued its first post Phase I regulation affecting
utilities.53  Utilties could charge a price in excess of their existing price if
the increase was approved by a state or federal regulatory commission.
Utilities which averaged more than $100 million in revenues were required
to report to the Price Commission their requests for fare increases, and to
inform the Price Commission when that increase was granted. Utilities which
averaged between $50 and $100 million were required to inform the Price
Commission of any increases. The Price Commission retained the right to
review and limit the amount of any increase requested or authorized.
The first regulations issued November 17, 1971 gave no criteria as to
what would be considered a permissible price increase. This problem the
Price Commission attempted to solve by bringing out new regulations, which
became effective January 17, 1972. They directed that price increases in
excess of an existing price on January 16, 1972 would be allowed only if,
within 10 days, the Price Commission did not make a negative finding on any
of the following:
1. The increase was cost-based and did not reflect future infla-
tionary expectations;
2. The increase was the minimum required to assure contin-
ued, adequate and safe service or to provide for necessary ex-
pansion to meet future requirements; and
3. The increase was the minimum required to attract capital
at reasonable costs and not to impair the credit of the pub-
lic utility.54
The regulations were, for the most part, quite familiar to utilities and
carriers, as they were the same criteria that state commissions had been
using for 70 years.5 5  It was standard procedure in rate cases decided
53. See 36 Fed. Reg. 21953 (1971). It was amended the next day. 36 Fed. Reg.
22014 (1971). For a complete history of the relationship between the Price Commis-
sion and the utilities up until June, 1972, see D. Toll, Price Commission Regulation of
Public Utilities, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S SECTION ON PUBLIC UTILITY LAW
ANNUAL PUBLICATION 5 (1972).
654. See 37 Fed. Reg. 632 (1972). The Price Commission also had the option of
acting if it determined that the increase did not conform with the overall objective of
maintaining average price increases across the economy at a rate of no more than 21/2
percent a year. The Price Commission attempted to make itself an appellate review
board through the use of this check. All utilities and carriers seeking price in-
creases had to obtain certain certifications from their regulatory agencies, or, if not
regulated, to self-certify to certain matters. Although the January 17, 1972 regula-
tions had meant to limit the review period to ten days of notice, any increases put in
effect after November 15, 1971, until the adoption of the new regulations could still
be rescinded or modified. Therefore, on February 8, 1972, the Commission made an
announcement concerning price increases which were reported to the Commission be-
fore January 17, 1972. The Price Commission ordered February 24, 1972 to be the
date those increases would become final. 37 Fed. Reg. 2359 (1972).
55. R. BESSE, SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION IN A COM-
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under the Price Commission criteria to make note of this fact. An example
is the opinion of the Public Service Commission of the District of Columbia,
July 28, 1972, granting a 7.84 percent rate increase to the Potomac
Electric Power Co. 56 The Public Service Commission of the District of Co-
lumbia had received a certificate of compliance from the Price Commission
on July 20, 1972. Its opinion in part read as follows:
• . . [w]e . . . note that we have followed in this proceeding
the same regulation policies and procedures that we have fol-
lowed in the past. We are an original cost jurisdiction, and our
normal approach to ratemaking has been to find an original cost
rate base; to determine, again on the basis of costs, allowable ex-
penses; to establish, as a matter of judgment on the basis of expert
testimony with respect to the cost of equity and senior capital, a fair
and reasonable rate of return; to compute, on the basis of the fore-
going findings and determinations, the overall revenue require-
ment to be met through rates for service; and finally, to consider
and approve rate schedules which will justly and reasonably pro-
duce the computed revenue requirement. We have done pre-
cisely that in this case. * * * Clearly, then the increase allowed
here is cost-justified. It reflects only experienced cost, contains
no additives, and does not take into account future inflationary
expectations.
* * * [i]t would be difficult, if not impossible, to conclude that
the increase or the rate we allow here could properly be reduced.
There is no persuasive evidence of record on the basis of which we
could defensibly determine a lower rate base or a lower total ex-
pense allowance. * * * We would have serious concern that
any lower rate of return allowance might indeed not only impair
Pepeo's credit in today's financial markets but also be subject to
constitutional challenge. We therefore have no hesitation in
finding and determining that the increase and the increased rate
of return here allowed are the minimums needed to assure con-
tinued, adequate and safe service, to provide for necessary expan-
sion to meet future requirements, to attract capital at reasonable
costs and not to impair the credit of Pepco.
Walker, writing in the Public Utility Fortnightly, is representative of
the utility and carrier reaction to the regulations:
We interpret the Hope case to mean that the utility is to be allowed
the minimum rate necessary to cover its prudent operating costs
and allow it a rate of return on invested capital comparable with
that earned in the competitive sector, after appropriate adjust-
PETITIVE SOCIETY (1953), and W. Anderson, The Supreme Court and Recent Public
Utility Valuation Theory, 21 J. LAND & Pun. UTIL. ECON. 12 (1945); 64 Am. Jur. 2d
Public Utilities §§ 9, 135, 138, 190 (1972).
56. In re Potomac Elec. Power Co., Order No. 568 at 12-14 (Public Service Com-
mission District of Columbia, July 28, 1972).
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ment for risk differentials. This will assure that the utility is able
to compete effectively for capital and thus expand as required.
. . . It would seem that the new standards imposed by the
Price Commission are in large measure fully compatible with the
Hope criteria.5
7
Walker goes on to say that the one criteria which might possibly be un-
familiar is that prohibiting increases reflecting inflationary expectations. But
if the criteria is unfamiliar, it is because utility prices simply do not reflect
inflationary expectations. Herbert B. Cohn made this clear in his statement
during the Price Commission hearings in February, 1972. While he was
speaking in behalf of the electric utilities, Cohn's statement is applicable
to other utilities.
Speculation reflecting future inflation is prohibited by existing
rate-making process. The rates allowed by a regulated electric
utility almost are always based upon costs already incurred. There
is a 12 month test period; only costs incurred during the test pe-
riod are used, adjusted for any changes that are known and measur-
able. No speculation as to future inflation can enter this process.58
Being little more than a restatement at the federal level of traditional
utility regulatory principles, the guidelines fell subject to the traditional
criticism of such guidelines. Koontz and Gable in their study of utility
rate making summarize this criticism: "Analysis of these rules of rate
making will show how broad they are. Essentially, they set no formula
or standard for commission action."5  Vermont Attorney General Jeffards
brought this problem before the Price Commission in February, 1972.
"State agencies are in the dark as to what to do. The effect is to do nothing.
. . . The guidelines are without substance." 60
The enforcement of the guidelines reflected the fact that the Price Commis-
sion itself admitted the guidelines were without substance. For example,
price increases, according to the guidelines, had to be cost based. Yet
the Price Commission never asked for any cost data from the regulatory
agencies.61 The Price Commission had only two lawyers and their secretaries
to look after guideline enforcement. Neither lawyer had had previous expe-
rience in the utility rate making area. Less than a month after the
57. P. Walker, 89 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 55, 59 (June 8, 1972). See also E. Cassady, Will
the Price Commission Rules Work, 89 Pun. UTIL. FORT. 120 (June 8, 1972).
58. See H. Cohn, Statement Before the Price Commission 373 (February 24, 1972).
59. H. Koontz & R. Gable, Public Control of Economic Enterprises 98 (1956).
60. M. Jeffords, Statement Before the Price Commission, 2 Price Comm'n Hearings
on Public Utilities 803 (February 24, 1972). See also F. Heinimann, Issues and
Alternatives in Economic Stabilization Phase 11, 18 PRAc. LAWYER 39, 47 (1972)
which notes in general the lack of standards in Phase II.
61. M. Frederiksen, Statement Before the Price Commission, 4 Price Comm'n
Hearings on Public Utilities 1041 (February 24, 1972).
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guidelines were issued there were 9000 pending utility and carrier rate
increase cases for these two lawyers to handle, and 40 percent of the Price
Commission's mail involved utility rate increases.
6 2
As might be expected, considering all their short comings, the guidelines
of January 17, 1972, did little to abate the utility industry's ever mounting
prices. The Consumer Price Index for Utilities and Transportation of
January, 1972 rose 1.2 percent. 63  This was 12 times faster growth
than the general Consumer Price Index for all items during the same month.
Following the consumer price index for utilities and transportation increase
of 1 percent in December, 1971, the Price Commission was under intense pres-
sure to do something to stop utility price increases. On February 10,
1972, the Price Commission turned to the one method which had been
effective against utility prices. The Price Commission called for a total
freeze of all utility prices not legally in effect February 9, 1972.64 This freeze
was to last one month, until March 10, 1972, but was extended to March 25,
1972. 15 Four days of public hearings on how utility prices should be handled
were held in late February, 1972.
Regulation of the Utility Industry by Indirect Controls
The solution which the Price Commission imposed after the second price freeze
was politically effective. It took the pressure off the Price Commission
to control utility prices. Unfortunately the solution did not consist of
solving the utility price increase problem. The solution, in essence, was
that the Price Commission would give full authority to the utility regulatory
commissions to apply the January 17, 1972, guidelines. Once the regulatory
commissions promised to apply them, the Price Commission would forego any
62. According to V. Hirschberg, Higher Utility Rates Loom as Price Panel Assigns
Control Duties to Regulatory Agencies, 4 NAT'L J. 512, 515 (1972), the utility and
carrier price controller's previous experience had been in the area of selling com-
puters to the utility and carrier industry. Id. at 513 gives the following breakdown of
pending applications by type of utility that were before the Price Commission:
Amount of Percent of
Number Applicant Revenue Revenue
of Revenues Increase Increase
Type of Utility Applications (millions) (millions) (%)
Communications 73 $19,063.3 $1,963.7 10.30
Electric 48 10,986.7 1,125.3 10.24
Gas 35 5,558.3 437.2 7.87
Gas and electric 23 5,431.0 325.5 6.49
Transportation 8 12,791.7 269.4 2.11
Water and sewage 11 2.9 1.2 42.47
Totals 198 $53,833.9 $4,149.4 7.71
See also M. Musicus, Statement before the Price Commission, 4 Price Comm'n
Hearings on Public Utilities 1041 (February 24, 1972).
63. See note 51 supra.
64. 37 Fed. Reg. 3094 (1972).
65. 37 Fed. Reg. 5104 (1972).
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review of price increases. Any future increases in utility and carrier prices
would be blamed on the regulatory commissions, not the Price Commission.
The new regulations were published on March 18, 1972. Chairman
Grayson of the Price Commission described the new regulations as establishing
"a new procedure which permits the Price Commission to regulate utilities
through the regulators."6 6 Under section 300.004 of the March 18, 1972,
regulations, each existing regulatory agency was required to submit to the
Price Commission a proposed set of rules for use by that regulatory agency in
considering requests for price increases for each kind of utility service
under its jurisdiction.6 7  The proposed rules had to encompass the guide-
lines of January 17, 1972.68 Section 300.004 provided in part:
If the Price Commission approves a set of proposed rules and the
proposed reporting procedure relating to those rules, it shall give
the regulatory agency a certificate of compliance with the Eco-
nomic Stabilization Act pertaining to those rules. A set of proposed
rules to which the Price Commission makes no response within 30
working days after receiving them shall be considered as approved,
and the Commission shall issue a certificate of compliance to the
regulatory agency. If the regulatory agency theretofore has,
or thereafter does, take appropriate binding action to adopt the
rules as approved by the Price Commission as rules the regulatory
agency will use in the determination of cases, all price increases
which the regulatory agency approves thereunder shall be consid-
ered to be in compliance with the Economic Stabilization Pro-
gram. The decisions of 4 regulatory agency pursuant to
those rules are not subject to review by the Price Commission, or by
any judicial or other body which would not be authorized to re-
view the decisions of the regulatory agency in the absence of the
Economic Stabilization Program. 69
66. Price Commission Release #75 (March 17, 1972); 37 Fed. Reg. 5701 (1972).
67. 37 Fed. Reg. 18894 (1972) renumbered the regulations. The renumbered
regulations are used throughout this paper.
68. In addition several additional guidelines were included, all of which were more
or less familiar to the utility and carrier commissioners. The additional guidelines
were: (1) The increase does not reflect labor costs in excess of those allowed by Price
Commission policies; (2) The increase takes into account expected and obtainable
productivity gains, as determined under Price Commission policies; and (3) The pro-
cedures of the regulatory agency provide for reasonable opportunity for participation
by all interested persons, or their representatives, in its proceedings.
69. The proposed rules which were submitted by the Wisconsin Public Service Com-
mission on June 27, 1972, and which were certified on October 10, 1972, are typical.
See Wisconsin Public Service Commission, Rules Within the Meaning of and Pursuant
to § 300.004 of the Regulations of the Price Commission for Use by the Public Service
Commission of Wisconsin in Considering Requests for Price Increases for Each
Kind of Public Utility Service Under Its Jurisdiction, Pursuant to Authority Granted in
§§ 196.02(1), 227.014 and 227.02(l)(b), Wisconsin Statutes at 1-2 (1972). § I is a
statement of purpose: "The purpose of these rules is to meet all requirements specified
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The regulatory commissions were quick to obtain certificates of compliance
from the Price Commission. When the Price Commission was terminated on
January 11, 1973, thirty-one commissions had obtained certificates of com-
pliance.
70
Being generally one and the same with the guidelines of January 17, 1972,
and the traditional guidelines used by commissions to regulate prices, the
March 18, 1972 guidelines suffered the same defect of being broad to
the point of giving the commissions no guidance in setting prices. 7' But
the regulatory commissions were at an even greater disadvantage, in applying
the guidelines than the Price Commission. The point is well made by
Senator Fred Harris:
The public utility commissions have neither the resources, staff-
ing nor inclination to generate an aggressive testing of the evi-
dence produced by the companies. To rest with these agencies
the additional role of enforcing a coordinated, national economic
policy installs the rabbits as guardians of the public's lettuce.
72
In different words, Vermont Attorney General Jeffords says the same thing.
The primary duty and concern of the regulatory agencies is to
insure adequate utility service by a financially healthy company
in § 300.004 of the regulations of the Price Commission." § II enumerates the enter-
prises to which the rules apply. § III states the scope of the rules, which includes all
hearings, final orders and proceedings on rate increases. § IV lists the general statutes
and existing Wisconsin Administrative Code provisions which will continue to be ob-
served. This includes provisions providing for hearings, notice, evidence and rate base
valuation. § V lists the criteria required by § 300.003 of the Price Commsision regu-
lations. Then follows a statement of how the criteria will be applied. For example,
criterion I states:
No rate increase shall be authorized for a public utility by the Public Service
Commission of Wisconsin, except as otherwise provided herein, unless said
commission finds and determines that it does meet the following general cri-
teria: A) It shall be justified on the basis of cost and not reflect future in-
flationary expectations. B) It shall constitute the minimum required by the
utility to assure continued adequate and safe service or to provide for neces-
sary expansion to meet its future requirements.
For a statement of how the above criteria will be applied see id. at 7-9.
70. The following commissions had been issued certificates of compliance under
§ 300.304(c) of the Price Commission regulations at the time of termination of the
Price Commission: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Caro-
lina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Washington,
Wisconsin. In addition, two federal regulatory commissions, the Civil Aeronautics
Board and the Interstate Commerce Commission were granted certificates of com-
pliance. See 37 Fed. Reg. 28096 (December 20, 1972); 2 CCH ECON. CONTROLS,
1101.50 (1972).
71. See L. METCALF & V. REINEMER, OVERCHARGE 29-31, 59-62 (1967); R. FELL-
METH, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSIONS THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 136-190 (1970); and nn.54, 56 supra.
72. F. Harris, Statement Before the Price Commission, 1 Price Comm'n Hear-
ings on Public Utilities 142 (February 24, 1972).
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and not to adjust for and visualize the anti-inflationary impact
upon either the economy or the consumer of their allowance of
rate increases.
78
The purpose of the regulatory agencies is two-fold. They must protect the
consumer against the price demands of monopolies, but they must also set
rates high enough to enable the utility to be sufficiently profitable not only
to stay in business but to attract capital for improvements at fairly reason-
able rates of interest. These dual responsibilities, to be low on the one side
and high on the other, are actually in conflict and the task is to strike a bal-
ance between the two. The regulatory commissions have limited jurisdic-
tion, operate within specialized areas, and are governed by law that do not
allow them to determine and assess the broad national economic impact of
a particular rate increase. The function and responsibility of the Price
Commission was quite different. According to section 202 of the Economic
Stabilization Act, the Price Commission had to endeavor "to stabilize the econ-
omy, reduce inflation, minimize unemployment, improve the nation's com-
petitive position in world trade, and protect the purchasing power of the
dollar."
The inherent inconsistency in the type and purpose of regulating engaged
in by utility commissions, as compared with price control programs, is
perhaps best understood by an analysis of the historical origins of the
systems of regulation. Judge Leventhal offers the following analysis:
The different situations which gave rise to these programs [utility
regulation on the one hand, price controls on the other] led
to differences in the content and underlying standards govern-
ing prices and rates. Thus the concept of 'just and reasonable'
in the public utility statutes oriented against extortion by a mo-
nopoly is typically construed in terms of limiting the utility to a
'fair return' on utility property, whether determined by book value
or a current valuation process. But the 'generally fair and equi-
table' standard of wartime maximum price regulation, aimed at
price stability in the face of abnormal inflationary pressures,
was administered in terms of an industry profits standard defined
as the profit levels prevailing during the years prior to the onset
of World War II, with the result that in terms of return on invest-
ment there were material differences between industries.
74
Partly in response to such problems, partly because regulatory commis-
sions continued to grant rate increases in much the same manner as in pre-
Price Commission days, and partly because utility prices continued to
73. M. Jeffords, Statement Before the Price Commission, 2 Price Comm'n Hear-
ings on Public Utilities 803 (February 24, 1972).
74. H. Leventhal, Vitality of the Comparable Earnings Standard for Regulation of
Utilities in a Growth Economy, 74 YALE L.J. 989 (1965).
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inflate, the Price Commission took a step in the direction of regaining
direct control. On December 20, 1972, the Price Commission proposed
amending its regulation 300.305 to prescribe reporting requirements for
agencies holding a certificate of compliance from the Price Commission.7"
It was proposed that rule 300.305 would require quarterly reports of price
increases pending, total annual revenues, and revenue increases applied for;
and would require quarterly reports of increases granted, annual revenues and
amounts increased. In addition such other information as would allow the
Price Commission to determine if regulatory agencies were acting in con-
formity with terms of their certificates of compliance had to be supplied.
This included the following information: type of utility, total revenue, rate
of return, operating ratio, and equity rate of return.
However, before the regulation change became effective, the President
announced the end of Phase II of the economic stabilization program on Jan-
uary 11, 1973.76 As a result, no experience under the new reporting regu-
75. 37 Fed. Reg. 28080-81 (December 20, 1972). All agencies, when issued cer-
tificates of compliance, had agreed to submit whatever information was requested in
the future by the Price Commission. Proposed regulation 300.305 amendment would
not become effective until January 20, 1973. Up until this point comments on the
proposed rule were to be accepted.
76. Exec. Order No. 11,695, 38 Fed. Reg. 1477 (January 12, 1973) in part reads:
The Pay Board and Price Commission established by sections 7 and 8 of
Executive Order 11,627 are hereby abolished effective not more than 90 days
from the date of this order or such earlier date as the Chairman of the Cost
of Living Council may designate.
The Phase III program was intended to be applied voluntarily and/or self-administered
basis. See sec. 130.11, 38 Fed. Reg. 1480 (January 12, 1973). The Phase III program
was intended to reduce the rate of inflation by setting a general price standard which
it was hoped would guide industry in its pricing policy. The general standard for
price adjustments was that
a person may increase prices above those authorized or lawfully in effect on
January 10, 1973, to reflect increased costs so long as his profit margin does
not increase over that which prevailed during the base period as modified
herein. Alternatively, a person may increase prices by a weighted annual
average of 1.5 percent over prices authorized or lawfully in effect on January
10, 1973, to reflect increased costs without limitation as to profit margin.
Adjustments in excess of the standards may be made only as necessary for
efficient allocation of resources or to maintain adequate levels of supply. The
principles and policies contained in the Price Commission's regulations in
effect on January 10, 1973, can be used in applying the standard. No price
increase should be placed into effect which is unreasonably inconsistent with
the standard or the goals of the Economic Stabilization Program.
See sec. 130.13, 38 FED. REG. 1480 (January 12, 1973).
The Phase III approach was similar to the jawboning policy practiced during the
years 1962 to 1968, but reinforced by sanctions that were not available during those
years. The basic theory was that by concentrating on selective wage and price deci-
sions considered to be especially important, all other wage and price decisions could be
left to be determined by example and market forces. For a discussion of the philoso-
phy of Phase III see Statement of H. Houthakker, Professor of Economics, Harvard
University, Hearings on S. 398: A Bill to Extend and Amend the Economic Stabiliza-
tion Act of 1970 Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Af-
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lation was logged by the Price Commission. While the Price Commission
was heading in the right direction, rule 300.305 would have been of little
use in coping with utility prices as long as utilities were not required to
follow a uniform system of valuation, rate making and accounting. With-
out a uniform method of determining rates of return, operation ratios and
equity rate of returns, such figures could not be meaningfully compared.
The proposed suggestion of price control regulations, which will follow,
elaborates on this point.
Phase III was an attempt to begin the exit from controls before control
inducted distortions in the economy became severe. The six months ot
Phase III, from January 11, 1973 to July 13, 1973, brought no change
as far as utilities were concerned. Utility prices had long since exited
from controls. The Cost of Living Council, which had been the parent
agency for the Price Commission, absorbed the functions of the Price
Commission when it was abolished. 77  The Cost of Living Council abandoned
the certification procedure and issued new regulations for utilities. 78
In keeping with the general Phase II policy, the prices of utilities were
not subjected to the same standard which was used for other indus-
tries.79 The new regulations merely restated the guidelines of January
17, 1972,80 and admonished utilities and their regulatory commissions
to abide by them in adopting price increases. While the Cost of Living
Council set up special programs to keep pressure on prices in the food,
health service and construction industries, the utility industries went un-
checked. During the six months of Phase III, the Utility and Public Trans-
portation Consumer Price Index increased at an annual rate of 3.6 points.
That is, 1.1 points above the 2.5 point goal set by the President. The
fairs, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. 270 (1973). Houthakker makes the following criticism of
this approach: "In practice the jawboning of the 1960's was directed at very few
industries, particularly metals, automobiles and rubber. Although these are very visi-
ble industries, they do not account for more than a few percent of our total GNP.
It is therefore not surprising that whatever success was achieved in those industries
had little significance for the economy as a whole. The same danger is clearly
present in Phase III, which also appears to reflect the idea that there are a few key
sectors where price and wage decisions have an importance extending beyond the
sector immediately affected. It is true that the increase in the price of steel, for in-
stance, makes the headlines in the newspapers, and that a decision by the undertakers
in Omaha to raise the price of funerals does not. In the aggregate, the many thou-
sands of decisions similar to that of the Omaha undertakers are far more important
than the decisions made by a few steel companies or the wage contracts reached in a
few visible industries. In our highly complicated and diversified economy there simply
is no small group of wage and price decisions that sets the standard for the rest.
77. Exec. Order No. 11,695 § 10, 38 Fed. Reg. 1473 (January 12, 1973).
78. 6 C.F.R. §§ 130.80-130.81 (1973).
79. See n.73, supra for the general price increase standard for Phase III.
80. See the text accompanying nn.53, 67, supra for these guidelines.
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Consumer Price Index for Gas and Electricity increased at an annual rate
of 5.8 points."'
President Nixon ended Phase III on June 13, 1973 when he ordered
prices frozen at levels in effect the week of June 1-8, 1973.82 For utilities
the freeze continued until August 12, 1973.83 During the freeze period the
Cost of Living Council members and staff engaged in consultations with busi-
nessmen, Congressional and government officials and consumer representatives
in order to draw up regulations for Phase IV. The proposed Phase IV reg-
ulations, which were released July 18, 1973, became effective August 12,
1973.84
While the regulations greatly tightened price control standards and in-
volved more mandatory compliance procedures than had been seen in Phase
111,85 public utility prices were totally exempted from Phase IV controls.
Even the fiction of regulation, the January 17, 1972 guidelines, were aban-
doned.""
A Suggested Method of Control of Utility Prices
The Cost of Living Council could not come up with a simple, speedy and
exact system of price controls for utilities, short of total price freeze.
87
81. See n.51, supra.
82. Exec. Order No. 11,723, 38 Fed. Reg. 15765 (June 15, 1973). The failure of
Phase III has been attributed to at least three principle forces. First, prices at the end of
Phase II were below what they otherwise would have been. There resulted the catch-
up phenomenon. Second, aggregate economic activity had been rising very strongly,
creating demand pressure in an increasing number of sectors. Third, since the Phase
III decontrol was not unequivocal, some price increases were motivated by anticipations
of the imposition of a new set of tight controls. See B. Bosworth, The Current Infla-
tion:Malign Neglect?, BROOKINGS PUBLICATIONS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 263-283 (1973);
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports 1483 (June 16, 1973).
83. Exec. Order No. 11,730, 38 Fed. Reg. 19345 (July 19, 1973).
84. 38 Fed. Reg. 19,464 (July 20, 1973).
85. The new regulations required prenotification by all firms with annual sales
of more than $100 million, quarterly reporting by firms with annual sales or revenues
of over $50 million, and annual reporting by non-exempt firms with annual sales less
than $50 million and over 60 employees. Cost of Living Phase IV Regulations
§§ 150.60.62, 150.151, 38 Fed. Reg. 19,476 (July 20, 1973). The new regulations
established a new base period for both prices and costs of the last fiscal quarter before
January 11, 1973. § 150.101. The new regulations prohibited use of costs incurred prior
to the new Phase IV base period as justification for price increases. Finally, the
new regulations permitted costs to be passed-through only on a dollar-for-dollar basis.
86. Cost of Living Phase IV Regulations § 150.56, 38 Fed. Reg. 19,474 (July 20,
1973).
87. The typical method by which rates were reviewed by the Price Commission is
illustrated by the New York Telephone Company's 7.16 percent rate increase of
February 3, 1972. On February 15, 1972, consumer protests forced the Price Commis-
sion to suspend the rate increase until it could be "investigated." See Price Commis-
sion Release #58 (February 15, 1972). On March 30, 1972, without explanation,
without public hearings, and without any type of supporting evidence, the Price
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This is the reason the Cost of Living Council failed to control utility prices,
both when it attempted direct controls and when it attempted indirect
controls through delegation of its authority. It is the contention of this
paper that if such had been done, it would have taken little effort to
arrive at a fairly simple and speedy control of utility prices. The following
outlines at least one method by which a simple and speedy set of utility
price controls could be obtained. The particular approach suggested here,
follows closely the philosophy of John Bauer's Updating Public Utility Regu-
lation.88
Three steps would be required. These steps would only be temporary, to
last as long as the price controls in other industries. However, once these steps
were initiated, it is likely that utility regulatory commissions would con-
tinue to follow them, at least in large part. This is because the method
of regulation to be suggested here is far easier to apply and more fair to
all concerned, than present systems of regulation.
The first step would involve the establishment of a uniform national
system of accounting for all utilities. At present each regulatory com-
mission has its own separate method of accounting. The result, as ex-
perienced by the Price Commission, is that each time a rate increase is re-
viewed, a whole new system of accounting must be mastered. Each system is
highly complex and there are numerous rate increase requests waiting for re-
view at any given time, so that even during the period when the Price Com-
mission attempted to regulate utility prices, rate increases were allowed
to take effect largely by default.
The second step in obtaining effective price controls would be to set a fixed
annual national rate of revenue return that would be allowed utility
Commission declared that the increase met the Price Commission standards. Price
Commission Decision List 72-60 (March 30, 1972). The company had been granted
a $160 million increase in July 1971. The February 1972 increase amounted to $190
million in increased prices. M. Musicus in testimony before the Price Commission
stated:
The New York consumer, asked to pay 26 percent more for telephone service
within six months, is interested in knowing that the Price Commission re-
viewed the record and took some affirmative action. After having adjudged
7.875 percent rate of return on total capital as being necessary in 1970, the
New York State Public Service Commission's decision to authorize at this time
a rate of return of 8.23 percent on total capital and 10.9 percent profit on sales
appears to warrant further examination as to its inflationary implications.
M. Musicus, Statement Before the Price Commission, 1 Price Commission Hearings
on Public Utilities 4 (February 24, 1972).
UNITED STATES NEWS AND WORLD REPORT 38 (February 21, 1972) mentions that of
a sample of the 9000 applications for rate increases filed with the Price Commission
up to February, 1972, the increases ranged from 10 to more than 30 percent, despite
the 2.5 percent guideline of the Price Commission.
88. J. BAUER, UPDATING PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (1966) [hereinafter cited as
BAUER].
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investors on their investment dollar.89 The actual cost-of-money would
be the measure of the annual dividend. As Bauer states:
Each [regulatory] commission should fix . . . for each company
under its jurisdiction a fair dividend rate on the existing stock out-
standing, and subsequently require all further stocks to be issued
on the basis of the dividend rate as fixed. It should further pro-
vide definite and continuous protection so that the investors will
actually get the dividend payments according to underlying
agreements and expectations.9"
The rate would be the same for all utilities throughout the country during
the period of the price controls. Such would lead to certainty in rate
making and end the problem of case by case review of multitudes of rate
increases by the price control authorities. Because all utilities would follow
the same uniform accounting procedures, all investors would be treated
equally as to their rate of return.
The third step that would be needed in this suggested method of price
controls involves the means by which the investor's annual return is pro-
tected. Each utility would be required to establish a "mandatory rate
equalization reserve," as Bauer calls it.
Step One: Uniform System of Accounting
The lack of a unified accounting system in the utility industry was a prime
reason why controls over utility prices were so difficult to maintain. 91 A
majority of federal and state regulatory commissions require some sort of
uniform system of accounts. 92  However, such uniformity applies only to
the particular type of industry regulated, in the case of federal commissions,
or to the particular state, in the case of state commissions. Jay Price, et al,
in considering why national uniform accounting standards have not been
89. An alternative to a fixed dividend would be a fixed annual percentage price
increase that would be allowed all utilities and carriers, perhaps 2.5 percent. If steps
one and three were not adopted, that is, if there was no uniform system of accounting
for utilities and carriers, and no method by which utility and carrier investors could be
assured an annual fixed return, then the above mentioned alternative might well be
preferable. However, the above mentioned alternative is much less precise than the
suggested method. Some utilities and carriers would profit more than others from it.
It would simply continue present inequalities and there would be no method of de-
termining if some utility and carrier investors were receiving more than a fair return
on their investment. But the alternative would put a concrete hold on inflation in
utility and carrier prices, just as the suggested method would. See n. 97 infra,
especially the discussion regarding Fifteen Percent Case, 226 I.C.C. 41 (1938).
90. BAUER at 119-20.
91. For a history of attempts to establish a uniform system of accounting see J.
Price, Accounting Uniformity in The Regulated Industries, 30 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 824 (1965).
92. Id. at 828-830.
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adopted by regulatory agencies, and thus failing to produce uniformity
except on an agency-by-agency or jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis, give
two reasons:
(1) The purposes of regulation have not included the achievement
of uniformity except in so far as effective regulation of rates
and services requires it, and
(2) The accounting profession has not provided guidelines, con-
sisting of sound accounting principles and standards, upon
which conscientious regulators could base a uniform system of
accounts.
93
Grady's Inventory of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles for Business
Enterprises states that an accounting practice becomes a "generally ac-
cepted accounting principle" when there is "authoritative support" for it,
and lists as one of several sources of such authoritative support the various
uniform systems of accounts set forth by regulatory commissions. 94 This
amounts to a delegation of professional judgment to determine what is
sound accounting, with the result that the AICPA would be bound by the de-
cisions of regulatory agencies on accounting matters. With such circularity of
reasoning, the Institute would have little claim to standing before any agency,
and the agencies could hardly be expected to look to the profession for
meaningful guidance in the determination of sound, objective account-
ing principles.
Price, et al, in concluding their article, make the following observation:
The over-all experience of the regulated industries would indicate
that comparability in financial reporting could readily be obtained
on major matters of principle if an organizational form could be
developed to arbitrate disputes concerning principles that should
be employed in all public financial reporting. . . . The ultimate
objective must be comparability in financial reporting both
.among companies within a single industry and among companies
in different industries, so that substantial factual matters are not
hidden from the public view by accounting flexibiliy. These
goals should and can be reached without incurring a costly bur-
den of detailed or straitjacket uniformity. Existing regulatory
commissions have a built-in bias springing from their historic stat-
utory goals that may disqualify them as objective prescribers
of sound accounting principles that are fair to all segments of the
population. Unfortunately the AICPA seems also to have dis-
qualified itself from achieving this objective by knowingly acquiesc-
ing in multiple standards of accounting both through a lack of
independence from outside pressures and through an unwillingness
93. Id. at 847.
94. P. GRADY, INVENTORY OF GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES FOR
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 52-52 (AICPA ACCOUNTING RESEAIrCH STUDY No. 7, 1965).
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to seek, through professional action, required accounting principles
that produce comparable financial statements in many obvious in-
stances where this is possible. 95
The Price Commission and Cost of Living Council would have been the
logical organization to cure the utility industry of its accounting disunity.
Such is absolutely essential if the Cost of Living Council is to regulate utility
prices in the future and if investors, creditors, consumers, labor, manage-
ment and the public at large are to be given fair and impartial treatment.
The most significant of the differences in accounting methods resulting
from the lack of uniformity are in the following areas: income tax expense,
plant, related depreciation, and valuation, items to be charged or credited
to income or surplus, current assets and current liabilities, capitalization of
construction overheads, charitable contributions and capital stock ex-
pense.96 Number two above, "plant, related depreciation and valuation,"
will serve as an example of the problems created by disunity of account-
ing methods. Utility rate-making follows two basic steps: first, the
utility's cost of service under prudent management is determined; second,
the utility is authorized to charge for its services under schedules of rates
which, on an anticipated volume of business, will produce total revenues
expected to cover the cost of service. 97 The cost of service is the sum of
operating expenses, depreciation expense, taxes, and a reasonable return
on the net valuation of the property devoted to the public service. The
total net value of the company's tangible and intangible capital is called
the "rate base" or the valuation for rate-making purposes. The rate
base is composed principally of the net (or depreciated) valuation of
the public utility's tangible property, comprising the plant and equipment
used and useful in serving the public. In addition, the rate base includes an
allowance for working capital and, depending on the circumstances, may also
include amounts for the overhead costs of organizing the business, intangi-
bles, and going-concern value.
The key issue in the determination of the rate base is the valuation of the
public utility's plant and equipment. This is because the valuation of plant
and equipment is the largest component part of the rate base and the partic-
ular valuation method employed can affect the size of this principal com-
95. See J. PRICE, R. Walker & L. Spacek, Accounting Uniformity in the Regulated
Industries, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 849 (1965).
96. For an expansion on each of these areas and the problems created by disunity
of accounting in each area see Id. at 839-845.
97. For a complete discussion of the methods of determining rate base, see P.
GARFIELD, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 56-83 (1964); E. CLEMENS, ECONOMICS AND
PUBLIC UTILITIES (1950), and BAUER, 49-74.
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ponent. The greater the valuation of public utility tangible property, the
greater will be the rate base and, therefore, the total cost of service, other
things remaining equal.
The principal valuation methods which are applied to a public utility's
tangible property in order to measure that component of the rate base are:
(1) actual cost less depreciation; (2) reproduction cost new less depreciation;
and (3) "fair value". Variations in each of these approaches are found.
Actual cost methods include: historical cost, prudent investment, and
original cost.98 Generally speaking, historical cost includes both the con-
struction and acquisition costs of the properties serving the public, including
additions and betterments, less depreciation. 9 Where accounting records
have been inadequate, historical cost has been found by estimating the cost
of the present plant on the basis of costs of materials and labor at the time
each property unit was constructed or acquired, less depreciation. A sec-
ond actual cost method, prudent investment, may be taken as historical cost,
as defined, less any amounts found to be dishonest or obviously wasteful. 100
Under the prudent investment standard, every investment is assumed to be
prudent unless the contrary is shown. A third measure of actual cost, called
original cost, has acquired a specialized accounting definition since the
1930's.101 This definition holds that original cost is the total investment
cost of constructed and acquired property when first devoted to public serv-
ice, less depreciation.
Reproduction cost new is the cost of duplicating plant and equipment at
recent average prices, less depreciation. Sometimes used as a substitute for
reproduction cost is an approach called trended original cost. Valua-
tion by this method is found by multiplying the actual cost of each property
98. There are 29 jurisdictions that use some form of the actual cost method of
valuation. These include the Federal Power Commission, Arkansas, California, Col-
orado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Wash-
ington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. For a complete listing of the appropriate code
sections involving actual cost valuation, and the state court and administrative agency
interpretations of them, see Note, Confusion in Valuation for Public Utility Rate Making,
47 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1962); FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, FEDERAL AND STATE COM-
MISSION JURISDICTION AND REGULATION: ELECTRIC, GAS AND TELEPHONE UTILITIES
11 (1967).
99. See Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262
U.S. 276, 289 (1923) (historical cost is an estimate of prudent investment when ac-
counting records do not show original cost).
100. Id. (prudent investment resembles cost when first devoted to public use, but,
as explained by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his separate opinion, the investment must have
been made prudently).
101. See 47 C.F.R. § 31-01-3(x) (1971); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United
States, 299 U.S. 232 (1936).
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unit or class of units by the ratio of the cost index number for the present
year to the cost index number for the year property was installed, less de-
preciation.
102
Another approach to valuation, which originated in Smyth v. Ames, is
fair value method. 10  Fair value is a composite method which considers
102. The traditional concept of reproduction cost assumes that the existing property
is reconstructed as a whole in a single continuous operation. An engineering inventory
is made, a period of construction is estimated, and current prices are applied to the
units of property. These may be spot prices as of a given date or average prices for
one, two, three or five years. Wage rates and labor performance are also estimated.
Pittsburgh v. Public Util. Comm'n, 169 Pa. Super. 400, 82 A.2d 515 (1951).
Since World War II trended original cost has largely replaced estimates of reproduc-
tion cost. The practice first developed in the application of price indices to an esti-
mate of a reproduction cost already in existence in order to avoid the expense of
making another such estimate. Scranton-Spring Brook Water Serv. Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 119 Pa. Super. 117, 146,181 A. 77, 89 (1935). Trending has been ex-
tended to original cost by constructing index numbers for labor and materials and ap-
plying them to the original cost of the property as reflected in the primary accounts.
The trending is brought down to the cut-off date of the rate proceedings. Bell Tel Co.,
16 P.U.R.3d 207 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1956). There are important differences be-
tween a traditional estimate of reproduction cost and trended original cost. One is that
the former assumes that the property is reconstructed in a single operation and takes
account of the economics of scale, whereas the latter does not give consideration to such
economies because it is predicted on piecemeal construction. Sometimes used as a sub-
stitute for reproduction cost is an approach called "trended original cost." Valuation
by this method is found by multiplying the actual cost of each property unit or class
of units by the ratio of the cost index number for the present year to the cost index
number for the year property was installed, less depreciation.
103. 169 U.S. 466 (1898). The Supreme Court defined fair value as a judgment
figure to be derived by the regulatory authority after giving consideration to, inter alia,
original cost of construction, amount and market value of bonds and stock, and the
earning capacity of the property under particular rates prescribed by statute. This con-
cept of fair value was soon modified. In 1909 the Supreme Court held in City of
Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U.S. 1 (1909), that accrued depreciation must
be deducted from original and reproduction cost in establishing fair value. In addition
it was early realized that market value of securities and earnings could not properly
serve as the basis of determining earnings. The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352,
461 (1913). Consequently, "fair value" has been often re-interpreted as a judgement
figure predicated principally upon original and reproduction costs, both depreciated.
Prior to FDC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) the fair value method
as a result of Smith v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898) was followed in almost all jurisdic-
tions. St. Louis & O'Fallen Ry. v. United States, 279 U.S. 461, 487 (1929). This
meant that valuation for rate making was substantially uniform throughout the coun-
try, at least in principle, despite incessant and unremitting opposition to fair value as
the rate base by advocates of original cost. After Hope, regulatory agencies proceeded
to re-examine law and policy in the light of past experience and contemporary condi-
tions. Consequently, uniformity in valuation has been succeeded by the application of
a variety of valuation methods to rate-making, although fair value has demonstrated
remarkable vitality.
Fair value in some form governs the rate making in 19 jurisdictions. They include
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, New Mexico, New Hamp-
shire, North Carolina, Texas and the Virgin Islands. For a complete listing of the
appropriate code sections involving fair valuation and the court and administrative
cases interpreting these sections, see: Note, Confusion in Valuation for Public Utility
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both depreciated actual cost and reproduction cost new less depreciation, and
other factors affecting value, with each factor given the weight judged ap-
propriate to the individual case.
The main idea behind the current reproduction cost and fair value meth-
ods of valuation is that the investor is compensated for inflation by having
his original cost converted into dollars of the current year.104 This results in
increased rates to the consumer. The actual cost system of valuation also
compensates the investor for inflation, but in a different way. The actual
cost method compensates by adjusting the rate of return.10 5 It has been
stated that of the two techniques, the utilities prefer the current reproduction
cost-fair value method of compensation for inflation, as "the public does
not complain when the same effect (increasing charges) is achieved through
revaluation. For here it does not realize what is going on. The companies
center their attention on the rate base rather than the rate of return because
valuation is a mystery and earnings can thus be boosted with greater
Rate Making, 47 MINN. L. REV. 1-11 (1962); FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, FEDERAL
AND STATE COMMISSION JURISDICTION AND REGULATIONS: ELECTRIC, GAS AND TELEPHONE
UTILITIES 11 (1967). BAUER, 56-57 (1966), in discussing a Delaware rate case, gives
an example of how fair value valuation works. The Delaware statute gives the com-
mission power to determine:
• .. the fair value of the property .. . and in determining such fair value,
the commission may determine every fact, matter or thing which, in its jjudg-
ment, does or may have any bearing on such value; and may take into con-
sideration, among other things, the original cost of construction . . .; the
reproduction costs of the property . . .; and these, and any other elements of
value, shall be given such weight by the commission as may be just and right
in each case.
Bauer cites a 1957 rate case involving the Delaware Telephone that was before the
commission.
104. This assumes that the index of construction costs, which should be used in
reproduction cost valuation, and the living cost index, which measures the investors'
purchasing power, are the same. While they usually move in the same direction, the
construction cost index has been considerably above the cost of living index lately, re-
sulting in utility rates inflating even faster than the cost of living. More importantly,
the use of the cost of construction index overcompensates a company's common stock-
holders when prices rise. As interest on bonds and dividends on preferred stock are
fixed or subject to a limited return, they do not change with the price level. Earn-
ings on a common stock, therefore, will change by more than the price level. See
C. PHILLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 236 (1965). The actual cost method also
includes historical cost and prudent investment. Generally speaking, historical cost
includes both the construction and acquisition costs of the properties serving the public,
including additions and betterments, less depreciation. Where accounting records have
been inadequate, historical cost has been found by estimating the cost of the present
plant on the basis of costs of materials and labor at the time each property unit was
constructed or acquired, less depreciation. See Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 289 (1923) (historical cost is an estimate of
prudent investment when accounting records do not show original cost). A second
actual cost method, prudent investment, may be taken as historical cost, as defined, less
any amounts found to be dishonest or obviously wasteful.
105. See. C. PHILLLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 291 (1965).
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ease."'10 6 It can be well contended that the public is not the only one fooled.
While the Cost of Living Council did at times express concern about a per-




Yet either method increases prices, and is inflationary.
106. See C. WILCOX, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD BUSINESS 316-317 (1966).
107. It might well be argued that under guideline number one of the Price Commis-
sion guidelines of January 17, 1972, "the increase must be cost-based and not reflect
future inflationary expectations," only the original cost method of valuation for rate
making would be permissible. There is an inconsistency in trying to stabilize inflation,
and on the other hand, allowing increased prices because property valuation has been
inflated to make up for inflation. See note 53 supra. The Price Commission missed a
grand opportunity to solve once and for all the problem of what to do about inflation
in the valuation of utility plant and equipment. This question has plagued state
courts, legislatures and regulatory commissions for 70 years. In 1930, after many
years of controversy, the Supreme Court appeared to have resolved in favor of giving
great weight to compensating investors for inflation. In United Railways v. West, 280
U.S. 234 (1930) the Supreme Court said:
It is the settled rule of this Court that the rate base is present value and it
would be wholly illogical to adopt a different rule for depreciation ...
One of the items of expense to be ascertained and deducted [in computing the
annual return on property] is the amount necessary to restore property worn
out or impaired, so as continuously to maintain it as nearly as practicable at
the same level of efficiency for the public service. The amount set aside
periodically for this purpose is the so-called depreciation allowance. Mani-
festly, this allowance cannot be limited by the original cost, because, if values
have advanced, the allowance is not sufficient to maintain the level of effi-
ciency. Id. at 254, 253.
They then went on to quote from the Court's earlier decision, Knoxville v. Knoxville
Water Co., 212 U.S. 13-14 (1909) to the following effect:
... . [The utility] is entitled to see that from earnings the value of the prop-
erty is kept unimpaired, so that at the end of any given term of years the
original investment remains as it was at the beginning. 280 U.S. at 254.
* * * This naturally calls for expenditures equal to the cost of worn out
equipment at the time of replacement; and this, for all practical purposes,
means present value.
There were two significant dissents from the majority opinion of the Supreme Court in
the United Railways case, referring particularly to the computation of the provisions
for depreciation or capital exhaustion: one by Mr. Justice Brandeis and the other by
Mr. Justice Stone. Both urged that the annual provision for depreciation should be
based solely on original cost. Mr. Justice Brandeis argued that the purpose of de-
preciation was to preserve "the integrity of the investment" and that basing the
annual provisions on original cost would best accomplish this end. A footnote in his
opinion may suggest his reasoning:
In part, costs and values in the several future years will depend upon the gen-
eral price level. As to this, even the economist can know nothing, save how
the general price level has heretofore fluctuated from year to year; and that
periods of rising prices have ever been followed by periods of falling prices.
Id. at 278 n.49.
Mr. Justice Stone's reason for urging original cost was clearer. He said:
I will assume, for present purposes, that as a result of Smyth v. Ames, 169
U.S. 466 (1898), the function of a depreciation account for rate making pur-
poses must be taken to be the establishment of a fund for the replacement of
plant rather than the restoration of cost or value of the original plant
investment. Id. at 289.
He then argued that
[a] depreciation reserve, calculated on the basis of cost, has proved to be the
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Probably the greatest single change that a unified system of accounting
would bring would be the requirement that all utilities that are not cur-
rently required to employ the original cost method of valuation, would be
so required. This would involve some twenty commissions. 108
Even if step two and three were never taken, simply standardizing utility
accounting would solve many of the problems which the Price Commis-
sion could not handle during the earlier price controls. The most im-
portant advantage would be that the price increases of the various util-
ities and carriers could be compared with each other in a meaningful way.
With the present systems of valuation, the significance of increases in valu-
ation is hidden from regulatory authorities.
most trustworthy guide in determining the amount required to replace, at the
end of their useful life, the constantly shifting elements of a property ...
Id. at 290.
But the United Railways case did not conclude the matter. With the great depression
of the early 1930's and the decline in price levels, the difference between original
costs and replacement or reproduction costs became less pronounced. It appeared that
Stone's and Brandeis' observations might prove correct and that in the long run the
average of the general price level would be somewhere between the low costs of the
pre-World War I period and the relatively high costs of the early 1920's. And by
1934, when a question of depreciation was again before the Supreme Court on a con-
troversy regarding the estimated useful life of certain utility properties, the Court ap-
proved the utility company's voluntary use of original cost as the basis for deprecia-
tion. Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 292 U.S. 151 (1934).
Then in 1944, in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) an issue was
presented to the Court whether the Commission had acted arbitrarily in failing to give
any weight to present fair values of the properties devoted to public service and in ef-
fect making original cost the controlling factor. The Court refused to disturb the
holding of the Commission on the ground that in view of all the circumstances the
Commission had not acted arbitrarily in its determinaton of rates. The Court re-
ferred to its holding in FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575 (1942),
"that the Commission was not bound to the use of any single formula or combination
of formulae in determining rates." 320 U.S. at 602.
In upholding the Commission's use of original cost as the basis for depreciation the
Court reversed its former stand, specifically disapproving "the contrary holding of
United Railways Co. v. West." Id. at 606-607. It might at first appear that this de-
cision of the Supreme Court in the Hope case rules out any possibility of determining
provision for capital exhaustion on any basis other than original cost, at least as far as
jurisdictions which have rejected present "fair value" for the rate bases are concerned.
But the Hope case did not say that original cost alone was necessarily controlling or
that original cost could not be adjusted to reflect seemingly permanent changes in price
levels. The departure from the holding of the United Railways case was that replace-
ment or reproduction cost need not necessarily be given weight. The holding in the
Hope case was simply that in view of all the circumstances then present the action of
the regulatory body in using original cost could not be said to be unjust or unreason-
able.
Under these circumstances [price fluctuation between 1939 and 1944] the argu-
ments of Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Stone in their dissents in the United
Railways case still seemed applicable. The future still gave promise that price fluctua-
tions would average out at about the same level as they had in the past; and original
cost still seemed the most reliable test of average original purchasing power of the
capital invested.
108. See note 90 supra.
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Step Two: The Establishment of a Fixed Annual Rate of Return
on Utility Common Stock
Step two in obtaining an effective system of price controls involves the es-
tablishment of a fixed annual rate of return for utility investors. 10 9  The
second step would have a favorable impact on stabilizing utility rate levels.
Such would indirectly help to stabilize rate structures. 110 One could object
that the fact that utility investors assume a risk, just as investors in other
industries, indicates that they should be compensated just as investors in
other industries. Furthermore, fixed returns will mean no compensation for
the loss in buying power of the investment due to inflation and will hamper
capital fund raising efforts of utilities.
The first objection is answered by the fact that investor risks in most utility
enterprises are different than risks borne by investors in ordinary competitive
enterprises. Utilities are engaged in a natural monopoly and in essential
public services. They are protected from competition by regulation as well
as by inherent monopoly.
109. J. HERING & J. HUMPHREY, UTILITY REGULATION DURING INFLATION 34 (1971)
states: "Arguments about the proper rate base or an adequate rate of return are mere
legislative tempests in teapots; all a uility seeks is sufficient cash flow adequately to
meet all of its costs. The only reasonable variable is the earnings necessary to
compensate its equity investors and prevent flight of capital." He suggests an ap-
proach in which commissions would change their regulations so as to provide auto-
matic adjustments to the return on equity allowed, to the rate base, and/or to the
allowable rate of return. Such adjustments could be linked to an agreed-upon index,
such as the prime rate, the annual rate of inflation, or other equitable measures of the
financial market place. Such a suggestion is midway between present freely fluctuating
rates of return, and the fixed return advocated here. For other suggested methods of
improving the method of reaching the annual rate of return, see H. Somers, Rate of
Interest and Rate of Return: Cost of Money in Public Utility Rate-Making, THE
NEW ECONOMICS OF REGULATED INDUSTRY: RATE-MAKING IN A DYNAMIC ECONOMY
69-111 (J. Hering ed. 1968); Comment, Cost of Capital as a Rate Base Substitute,
80 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 74-77 (November 9, 1967); J. Nelson, Reassessment of Economic
Standards for the Rate of Return Under Regulation, RATE OF RETURN UNDER REGU-
LATION: NEW DIRECTIONS AND PERSPECTIVES 3-25 (H. Trebing & R. Howard eds.
1969); Note, An Earnings-Price Approach to Fair Rate of Return in Regulated In-
dustries, 20 STAN. L. REv. 287 (1968).
110. Rate regulation is not separated completely into that of levels and that of
structures. As a matter of fact, as H. KOONTZ AND R. GABLE, PUBLIC CONTROL OF
ECONOMIC ENTERPRISE 98 (1956) point out:
These two aspects are closely related. Very seldom can a shift in the rate
level be undertaken without upsetting many of the individual rate adjust-
ments. For example, when the Interstate Commerce Commission allowed a
general increase in the level of railroad rates in 1938, it recognized that
competition with other forms of transportation, as well as possible discrimina-
tion against localities, made in blanket increases of a certain percentage ap-
plied to all rates impracticable. Fifteen Percent Case, 226 I.C.C. 41 (1938).
It would not be necessary, nor would it be fruitful, for a national price control program
to attempt to make rate structures. Such structures depend on many variables, de-
pending on the utility or the carrier. At least at present, there is no simple way to
reduce the process to a uniform, nationwide procedure.
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The basic risk borne by the utility common stock investors results
from two uncertainties. Will a fair-return be obtained under regula-
tion, and will losses of return and capital investment be incurred because
rates cannot be fixed high enough or otherwise adjusted so that the total
revenues of the company will equal the total cost of service, including a re-
turn on invesment.' 11 Such risks would be eliminated by step three, which
will assure a fixed return, and relieve utilities of their justification for un-
limited speculative returns.
The second objection concerns the problem of inflation and changes in the
original dollar value basis of the investment as of the time when the invest-
ment was made. The risk is that, in time, the purchasing power of the dollar
will decline, and the investor will not be compensated for this loss. It is
true that investors in the ordinary nonregulated concern adjust their
dollar-returns to offset rising price levels. They increase the prices charged
for their own products.
In answer, it can be said that in the utility industry public policy has
never provided clearly and explicitly for the price level risks that have
prevailed.
There has been no outright economic and legal requirement for
price level adjustments in the regulatory process; nor has there
been clear and explicit contrary provision. The matter has been
111. BAUER 116-19 states:
Practically all the risks borne by investors have been due to the indefinite-
ness and conflicts of interest that have pervaded the standards and procedures
of regulation. Stockholders have been subjected particularly to regulatory un-
certainties and risks. . . . The regulatory risks have been the result of the
undefined and imprecise considerations that have applied to rate base and
rate of return findings; they have embraced also the uncertainties as to the
price level factor in the determination of fair returns. The stockholders
have never known what dollar returns they will get under prevalent regulation.
Between the spasms of rate cases, the stockholders would normally get in-
creasingly more than fair . . . returns; the extent would be uncertain, and the
date of interruption by another rate case indefinite. These . . . are . . . the
regulatory risks, risky not because of intrinsic industry and price level risks, but
because of the indefiniteness of regulatory standards and the irregular, uncertain
impacts of regulation. . . . So great has been the default in regulation of
certain commissions, that many utility stocks have been at times considered
growth stocks.
From the regulatory standpoint, utility stocks do not belong inher-
ently with the recognized growth grouping as to realizable returns per share.
While they do, or should, represent growth in demand for services and growth
in efficiency, they reflect more often poor regulation and insecure finance
when they are taken as growth stocks in regard to increasing earnings per
share. When capital funds are supplied for public use, the investors
should know exactly what returns in dollars they will receive. This has
been the standard for debts and preferred stock financing. It should be
adopted for common stock,
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shrouded in indefiniteness and vagueness .... 112
Direct cost-of-money, at actual-dollar amounts, has been adopted as the
measure of fair-return for about 60 percent of total utility investments (bonds
and debt financing). There is no fundamental economic or constitutional
grounds why the other 40 percent should not be exposed to the same treat-
ment. 113 If the annual dividend rate as fixed were fair to existing sharehold-
ers, it would automatically be fair to future investors who would supply new
capital funds as needed for efficient public service.
The third objection is concerned with the possible harmful effect which
fixed returns would have in raising capital. Capital funds can be obtained
as needed with common stock, just as it is now obtained for bonds and pre-
ferred stock which is subjected to fixed dividend provisions. At any given
time, the company would issue new common stock or bonds, or preferred
stock, or a combination, as may best fit the particular situation, subject to
commission approval. The variations in return requirements from time to
time would be automatically provided for by the successive issue prices of
the capital securities. This would apply to common stocks as to bonds and
preferred stocks.
Step Three: Rate Equalization Reserve
The third step would be to establish "a rate equalization reserve." 1 4  Such
a reserve would be the method by which investors would be assured of a
fixed annual rate of return. The reserve would also guarantee that con-
sumers were never overcharged, and would bring to an end rate making
litigation.
Since rates apply to the future, they cannot be fixed so that for each year
total revenues will equal total costs. For precise price control, there must
be annual equalization between total revenues and total costs, for the pur-
pose of exact accounting between consumers and investors. In general, the
112. Id. at 114.
113. W. Vickrey in UTILITY REGULATION DURING INFLATION 56 (J. Haring et al.,
eds., 1971) points out that in its extreme form the historical-cost school treats the
investor in a public utility the same way as a bondholder, entitled only to a specified
return in terms of nominal monetary units. If, due to a rise in prices, an accumulated
depreciation fund proves insufficient to replace a piece of equipment when it is worn
out, then additional outside financing must be sought.
114. See BAUER at 121-134 for a complete discussion of the rate equalization re-
serve. The reserve would stand as a company liability in the balance sheet. This
operating reserve would not constitute past company income accumulated as sur-
plus. It would not represent stockholders' equity like the conventional statement of
surplus. Instead, as a consumer prepayment, it would stand distinct and would be
definitely conserved for the consumers. In the course of rate-making, it would not be
embodied directly or indirectly in the total investment on which required returns
were predicated.
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rate equalization reserve would have the same make up as other operating
reserves that involve equalization or adjustment of charges from period to
period. In the beginning, after the initial determination of the required returns
to the investors and the establishment of fixed dividends as outlined in step
two, the Cost of Living Council would set rates as a whole at a level high
enough to provide, according to best appearing estimates, total revenues mod-
rately in excess of total costs, subject to periodic balancing through the revised
regular income statements. This would be modified so as to include in the
income deductions not only interest and other fixed charges but also pay-
ments or accruals of preferred and common stock dividends. These
would be obligations of the company, no different essentially from in-
terest, and would thus be charged regularly to the income account. The
common stock dividends would be a fixed percentage on par value or dollars
per share and would be charged accordingly to the income account.
If the proposed system were followed, the excess of total revenues, includ-
ing non-operating income, over total costs, as shown by the modified in-
come statement, would be transferred and credited to the rate equalization
reserve at the end of each accounting period, presumably at the close of
each calendar or fiscal year.
The excesses would be accumulated year by year in the reserve.
Its balance at the close of any year would show the extent that total
prior years revenues had exceeded total prior costs under the new
exact return accounting. When in any year total revenues were
less than total costs, the year's revenue deficiency will be made good
through an equal transfer from the reserve. It would be charged
to, or deducted from, the reserves and concurrently added or cred-
ited to the income account for its annual equalization. There will
thus be exact balancing each year between total revenues and
total cost, through the means of the reserve. The net total income
of the company would be shown regularly as the total net require-
ments for fixed interest and dividend payments (plus or minus
related credits or debits for proper amortization).' 15
What the normal standard of the reserve or its maximum and minimum
would be could not be stated in absolute terms."16 The Cost of Living Coun-
115. Id. at 122.
116. The extent that the reserve should be built up or accumulated would be sub-
ject to Cost of Living Council control under flexible rules for standard, maximum and
minimum provisions. If the maximum was reached or approached and if total reve-
nues still appeared substantially in excess of total costs, rates would be reduced to a
level which in prospect would result in current equalization of total revenues and
total costs. If, however, through greater cost increases than expected, or through un-
predicted declines in revenues, there were annual deficiencies, these would be charged
year by year to the reserve until its minimum authorized level had been reached or
approached; then rates would be revised upward to again provide estimated total
revenues equal to total costs and to rebuild the revenue to its normal standard.
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cil could of course, adopt general rules, but it would have to act largely upon
judgment in dealing specifically with each company and the prospects ahead.
It would base its judgments on the combination of functions that are in-
volved in the long-range balancing of total revenues and total costs. As
a rough suggestion, it might place the general standard at the total fixed re-
turn requirements for two years, with the maximum at three years, and
the minimum at one year, subject to such modifications as might be reason-
able to attain the purposes of the reserve.
The advantages to the rate equalization reserve are threefold: it would end
frequent rate changes and litigation, investors would be assured of a constant
and reliable return, and consumers would never over pay.
With such an equalization reserve there would be no need for frequent
rate changes. Minor adjustments might prove desirable from time to time,
the schedule as a whole would be left unchanged, unless revision, upward
or downward, became necessary or reasonable because of fundamental and
extensive changes in the relation of total annual revenues and costs. Between
such basic changes, the moderate fluctuations in revenues and costs would
be equalized annually through the reserve. Because the Price Commission
would apply exact and systematic regulation to an exact showing of facts,
there would be an end to rate cases. Regulation would be freed from litiga-
tion. Instead of being bogged down with rate cases and their cumbersome
involvements, the Price Commission and regulatory commissions could de-
vote their energies and staff to the constructive aspects of controlling prices
and improving service. They could investigate what improvements should
be made; what technological advances have been made and can be applied;
what improvements in efficiency and economy could be attained; and how, in
general, cost could be kept to economic minimums, consistent with proper
service.
These constructive phases of regulation are largely precluded by the con-
fusions encouraged under existing standards and procedures of rate
making. In rate case proceedings, the Cost of Living Council was inevitably
mired by indefiniteness and conflicts of interests between investors and con-
sumers, and regulation went largely by default. This is the unavoidable result
if the returns to which the investors, particularly the stockholders, are en-
titled, are not made explicit and protected by appropriate accounting meth-
ods.
Protection of both the investor and the consumer is another advantage of
the rate equalization reserve. The return of investors would be protected; in
the ordinary unregulated business stockholders have to go without dividends
or stand investment losses during depression periods. Consumers would
be protected against payment of higher rates. While the investors will get the
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benefit of exact annual protection, the consumers would get longer-range
protection. In any year, they would pay more or less than the required terms,
but in the long run they would pay only the required amounts, plus the
accumulated reserve balance. This balance would be accurately safeguarded
for them. It would not be available to the stockholders except to make up
deficiencies in later annual earnings for the payment of the required returns.
The consumers would have accurate continuous accounting in regard to
their total past revenue payments. Their basic gain would consist of exact
protection against excessive return payments.
To summarize, the justification of the reserve is based
[o]n the simple and elementary economic and legal principle that in-
vestors are entitled to fair-returns and no more, that consumers
should pay fair-returns and no more, that the rights and duties of
investors and consumers are reciprocal, and that they should jointly
be equalized. But, under past and prevalent regulation, there has
been, and is, a wide gap between providing fair-returns and "no
more.""1
7
While the Price Commission would have only been concerned that the reserve
be continued during its term of existence, it is likely that many regulatory
bodies would continue to make use of it voluntarily. If such were the case,
the benefits of the Price Commission's improvements would have continued
long after the actual price control program.
Conclusion
The delegation to the Cost of Living Council of power over utility prices
is unique in the history of utility regulation. Never before has a federal
agency been granted such powers. The reason for this grant is well expressed
by the Honorable Mary Hanuelton, who at the time was a Commissioner of
the Price Commission.
The reason for price controls on regulated industry was simply that
in an era of clamoring consumerism it was the intent of Congress
that all component of the economy be treated evenly and equitably
under the stabilization program.""
Initially the Cost of Living Council exercised its power, but with little
success. This led to a complete abandonment of price controls. The three
steps outlined here would assure success of utility price control. Even if
only the first step, promulgation of a uniform system of accounting, were
adopted, the Cost of Living Council could expect better results.
117. BAuER at 125.
118. M. Nammelton, Are Regulators Doing Their Part in the Battle for Economic
Stability? 48th Annual Convention of the National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners Proceedings 76 (1972).
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Steps two and three involve the establishment, respectively, of a national
rate of revenue return and the establishment of a mandatory rate equalization
reserve. Developed by John Bauer with no thought of an economic stabili-
zation program, steps two and three nevertheless might well fit the purposes
of the Cost of Living Council. In Bauer's scheme they represent a com-
promise between public ownership of utilities and reconstituted regulation.
As for my own thinking, I have more or less wobbled between
the public ownership view and the reconstituted regulation view.
The first was outlined in Public Organization of Electric Power
(1949) and the second in Transforming Public Utility Regulation
(1950). The present book (Updating Public Utility Regulation)
submits my end conclusion on how best to protect and promote
the public interest in public utilities.119
Bauer's scheme, applied to the economic stabilization efforts, is at least
one way in which the Cost of Living Council's power over utility prices
could be returned, and the Congressional mandate to restrict inflation could
be achieved.
119. BAUER at VIII.
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